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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent developments in China’s courts reflect a paradox largely 
avoided in literature on the subject: Can China’s courts play an effective 
role in a non-democratic governmental system? Changes to courts’ formal 
authority have been limited, courts still struggle to address basic 
impediments to serving as fair adjudicators of disputes, and courts 
continue to be subject to Communist Party oversight.  Courts have also 
confronted new challenges, in particular pressure from media reports and 
popular protests.  At the same time, however, the Party-state has 
permitted, and at times encouraged, both significant ground-up 
development of the courts and expanded use of the courts as fora for the 
consideration of rights-based grievances, including administrative 
litigation, class actions, and a small number of discrimination claims filed 
directly under the constitution.  Some courts have engaged in significant 
innovation.  Judges are better qualified than in the past, and are 
increasingly looking to other courts and judges, rather than Party 
superiors, in deciding novel or difficult cases.  As a result, courts are 
increasingly coming into conflict with other state institutions, growing 
numbers of well-educated judges are developing professional identities, 
and popular attention to both the problems and the potential roles of the 
courts appears higher than ever before.   
The current and potential future role of China’s courts has 
received wide attention.  In China, officials speak of the importance of 
court reform for ensuring China’s goals of legal construction and 
modernization.  But the aims of such reforms have been technical:  
improved training of judges, rooting out corruption, increasing efficiency, 
and overseeing judges more closely.  Such reforms appear aimed at 
making the courts institutions for the fair adjudication of individual 
disputes.  At the same time, commentators in China and in the West have 
argued for greater changes, contending that courts should serve not only 
as adjudicators of private disputes but also as checks on state power and 
as fora for the resolution of public rights – in sum, that the courts should 
play a significant role in the development of Chinese governance and 
society.   
Discussions in both China and the West, however, have largely 
avoided two central questions.  First, why has the Party-state permitted 
the courts to develop even limited new roles?  Second, can courts play an 
effective role in a non-democratic governmental system?  These questions 
have assumed renewed importance over the past two years as Party 
leaders have reemphasized the obligations of the judiciary to serve Party 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138446
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goals and as Party-state concern with public opinion and social stability 
has led to new pressures on the courts.   
This essay surveys recent developments in China’s courts with a 
view to beginning to answer these questions.  Part I examines recent top-
down reforms in China’s courts, highlighting what some advocates of a 
stronger judiciary consider signs of progress.  Part II discusses new 
challenges that may be undermining courts’ already limited autonomy.  
Part III argues that the most significant changes in China’s courts are 
coming from the ground up, in particular from growing horizontal 
interactions among judges.   Part IV asks whether recent developments 
suggest fundamental changes to courts’ power, and then returns to the two 
questions posed above.  My focus is primarily on civil and administrative 
litigation, where reforms have been more significant than in the criminal 
justice system. 
Much theoretical scholarship on courts focuses on why 
democratic systems permit and encourage the development of 
independent courts.  Explanations include the knowledge that rulers may 
one day find themselves out of office, the desire to make commitments 
credible, and the need to constrain bureaucracies. 1   Most such 
explanations have limited applicability in China, where courts are not 
designed to be independent of Party leadership.   Scholarship on the role 
of courts in authoritarian societies has been limited.  This essay seeks to 
add to this literature by exploring why a single-Party state might 
encourage court development, and whether courts can play significant 
new roles without necessarily challenging Party authority.  
 
II. REFORMED COURTS? 
 
A. Caseloads 
 
Western scholars have long warned against equating Chinese 
courts with their Western counterparts.  As Donald Clarke has noted, 
“perhaps Chinese courts are not designed to do, and should not do, the 
things Western courts do.” 2   Courts are one of a number of state 
bureaucracies with the power to resolve disputes, and lack significant 
                                                   
1 For a helpful summary, see Matthew C. Stephenson, ‘When the Devil Turns . . .’:  The 
Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 61-64 (2003). 
2 Donald Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND COMMON 
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 171, 164-192 (Erik Jensen & 
Thomas Heller eds., Stanford University Press 2003).  As Martin Shapiro has noted, few 
courts anywhere fit the archetype of “independent judges applying preexisting legal norms 
after adversary proceedings to achieve a dichotomous decision.”  MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: 
A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (University of Chicago Press 1983). 
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oversight powers over other state actors.  For much of the period since the 
beginning of legal reforms in 1978, courts have remained minor actors in 
the overall functioning of the Chinese state.  Despite these differences, 
Chinese judges and academic commentators have in recent years looked 
to Western models of courts and judging in evaluating developments in 
China’s courts.3 
Are Chinese courts playing fundamentally different roles in 
society to those played in the recent past?   There is no clear benchmark 
for evaluating changes in the position of courts within the Party-state.  
Official reports have noted that Chinese courts are handling more cases 
than at any time in the past, with some claiming that China is facing a 
“litigation explosion.”4  For example, China’s courts reported hearing 8.1 
million cases in 2006,5  more than triple the number heard in 1986.6    Yet 
such comparisons overstate the growth of litigation in China:  as Table 1 
shows, caseloads have grown only modestly, if at all, since 1999.  The 
total number of cases heard in 2006 was only two percent higher than in 
2005, and the total number of first instance cases actually decreased by 
two percent between 1996 and 2006.   Similarly, the total number of first 
instance civil cases decreased in four years between 1999 and 2006; the 
                                                   
3 For example, see, Liao Weihua, Fayuan zuzhi fa jiang chutai zhuanjia jianyi jiang renmin 
fayuan gaiming fayuan [Court Organization Law Will Come Out, Experts Suggest Changing 
People’s Courts into Courts], NANFANG CHUANG [SOUTH CHINA WEB], Dec. 4, 2004, 
http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200412040062.htm.  Although noting that any 
reforms must accord with China’s “national conditions”, the Supreme People’s Court has 
acknowledged the need to look overseas in designing reforms of China’s courts. Supreme 
People’s Court, Renmin fayuan dierge wunian gaige gangyao (2004-2008) [The Second Five-
year Reform Plan of the People’s Courts (2004-2008)], Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=120832. 
4 Yan Maokun, Xiao Yang zai meiguo Yelu Daxue fabiao yanjiang Zhongguo sifa: tiaozhan yu 
gaige [Xiao Yang Gives Speech at Yale University on China’s Judiciary: Challenges and 
Reforms], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (CHINA COURT WEB), Oct.12, 2004, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/forout/200410120005.htm; Beijing susong shuliang baozhashi 
zengzhang, qunian 76% anjian weineng jiean [The Number of Cases in Beijing Increases 
Explosively, the Percentage of Not Closed Cases Increased by 76% Last Year], FAZHI 
WANBAO [BEIJING LEGAL TIMES], Apr. 27, 2005, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-04/27/content_2884636.htm.  
5 Courts reported hearing a total of 8,105,007 cases in 2006.  Xiao Yang, Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan gongzuo baogao (2007) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report (2007)], Mar. 14, 
2007, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=239089. The figure 
includes both first instance cases and appeals. Id.  
6 The contrast to earlier years is even more striking: official court statistics state that China’s 
courts handled just 300,787 first instance civil cases and 14,618 civil appeals in 1978, the year 
China began its economic reforms.  Hence civil cases have increased more than fourteen-fold 
since then.  RESEARCH OFFICE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Quanguo renmin fayuan sifa 
tongji lishi ziliao huibian 1949-1998 (minshi bufen) [Collection of Historical Judicial Data on 
the Entire Nation’s People’s Courts 1949-1998 (civil portion)], BEIJING: RENMIN FAYUAN 
CHUBAN SHE [PEOPLE’S COURT PRESS] (1999). 
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total number of administrative cases likewise decreased in four of those 
years.7  The modest increases are striking when set against the backdrop 
of China’s rapid economic growth and widespread reports of a surge of 
civil disturbances in China.8   
 The reliability of court statistics is questionable, and thus it would 
be a mistake to read too much into apparent increases or decreases in 
caseloads.  Adjustments to methodologies for collecting statistics, 
ideological emphasis in the courts, and incentives to and targets for 
individual judges can have a significant effect on the total number of 
cases courts report hearing. 9   Nevertheless, lower court judges have 
confirmed in interviews that, as the statistics indicate, caseloads have 
either declined or grown only modestly over the past five years.10   Judges 
attribute such declines to lack of confidence in the courts, in particular to 
difficulties successful litigants face in enforcing decisions, and to private 
parties’ preference for informal methods of dispute resolution.11 
 Even if the total number of cases has grown only slightly in recent 
years, the long-term trend appears to reflect a modest increase in the use 
of the courts, and that a greater range of cases and cases of greater 
complexity are being brought.  Litigants are also increasingly challenging 
                                                   
7 As Table 1 and Figure 1 show, the total number of first instance civil and administrative 
cases peaked in 1999; despite modest increases in recent years, the 2006 figures remained 
below the 1999 totals.  For analysis of the decline in caseloads, see Xin He, The Recent 
Decline in Economic Caseloads in Chinese Courts: Exploration of a Surprising Puzzle, 190 
CHINA Q. 352 (2007); Pan Duola, “Susong baozha” wei wenti de beihou [Behind the Fake 
Question of a “Litigation Explosion”], YANZHAO DUSHI BAO [YANZHAO METROPOLITAN 
DAILY), Apr. 28, 2005, available at 
http://he.people.com.cn/GB/channel10/200504/28/7821.html. 
8 The conventional wisdom has been that the economic development and reduced state control 
over individuals’ lives has resulted in a greater number of cases in the courts.  Thus, for 
example, Xin Chunying argues that greater use of the courts is a consequence of multiple 
factors, including the weakening of administrative oversight of individuals’ lives, the shifting 
role of Party-state units, and the lack of protections for rural workers.  Xin Chunying, 21 shiji: 
Zhongguo xuyao shenmeyang de sifa quanli? [The 21st Century: What Kind of Judicial Power 
does China Need?], ZHONGGUO FAZI WANG [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW, CHINA], 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=1712 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
9 For example, some judges attribute the decline in administrative cases to changes in 
reporting methodologies.  Whereas in the past a case involving fifty plaintiffs might have been 
counted as fifty cases, courts have recently begun to count such cases as a single case.   
Likewise, although the official Law Yearbooks show only a three-fold increase in caseloads 
since 1987, in a recent speech in 2004 the President of the SPC stated that the total number of 
civil cases handled by China’s courts had increased more than ten-fold over the past twenty 
years.  See Yan, supra note 5. 
10  Much of the information in this essay is based on interviews with more than 200 judges, 
lawyers, and academics in China.  Interviews were conducted in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Jiangxi, Hubei, Jilin, Sichuan, and Shaanxi between 2003 and 2007 [hereinafter 
Interviews]. 
11 Id. 
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first instance decisions: appeals have grown at a much faster rate than 
first instance cases, with appeals nearly doubling between 1995 and 2006.  
This increase in appeals suggests that litigants may be both more familiar 
with legal procedures, and perhaps more confident of the willingness of 
higher courts to issue decisions that differ from those of lower courts. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Number of cases (first instance and appeals) closed nationwide, 
1994-2006 
 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1st Crim. 480914 496082 616676 440577 480374 539335 
1st Civil12 3427614 3986099 4588958 4720341 4816275 5060611 
1st Admin. 34567 51370 79537 88542 98390 98759 
All 1st Inst. 3943095 4533551 5285171 5249460 5395039 5698705 
Criminal 
2nd 52579 53942 67087 64548 70767 78803 
Civil 2nd 179687 208263 243510 263664 294219 339929 
Admin 2nd 7672 9536 11365 12684 14220 18072 
All 2nd 239938 271741 321962 340896 379206 436804 
Letters & 
Visits to 
Courts13 
5847948 6361495 6960162 7131469 9351928 10691048 
Mediation 
by People’s 
Mediation 
Committees 
6123729 6028481 5802230 5543166 5267194 5188646 
 
 
 
                                                   
12 Prior to 2002 Chinese courts had separate divisions for handling civil cases and economic 
cases; they were merged in 2002.  The figures for 1994 to 2001 thus include both civil and 
economic cases. 
13 “Letters and visits” refers to complaints about cases received in writing or in person by 
courts; for a discussion of the letters and visits system, see infra pp. 26-29.  Complaints about 
the courts to letters and visits offices at other Party or state institutions are not included in this 
figure. 
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Source for 1994-2005 data: 1995-2006 ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN [CHINA LAW 
YEARBOOK]. 
Sources for 2006 data: 2007 SPC WORK REPORT (for first instance data); Supreme 
People’s Court, 2006 nian quanguo fayuan shenli zhixing anjian qingkuang [Details 
of Cases Tried and Enforced Nationwide in 2006], available at 
http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/ziliao/200703/20070314163527.htm (for data on 
second instance cases).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1st Crim. 560111 623792 628549 634953 644248 683997 701379 
1st Civil 4733886 4616472 4393306 4416168 4303744 4360184 4382407 
1st 
Admin. 86614 95984 84943 88050 92192 95707 95052 
All 1st 
Inst. 5380611 5336248 5106798 5139171 5040184 5139888 5178838 
Criminal 
2nd 86619 98157 89440 96797 96204 96776 94092 
Civil 2nd 363522 377672 357821 370770 377052 392191 406381 
Admin 
2nd 19404 22149 27649 25045 27273 29176 29054 
All 2nd 469545 497978 474910 492612 500529 518143 529527 
Letters & 
Visits 9394358 9148816 3656102 3973357 4220222 3995244 
Not yet 
available 
Mediation 5030619 4860695 4636139 4492157 4414233 4486825 Not yet available 
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Figure 1:  First Instance Cases, Mediation by People’s Mediation 
Committees, and Court Letters and Visits, 1994–2006 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Second Instance Cases (appeals), 1994–2006 
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The modest growth in litigation in the past few years suggests that 
despite emphasis on court reform, courts are not necessarily playing a 
greater role relative to other institutions engaged in dispute resolution.   
The increase in court caseloads coincided with a decline in the total 
number of disputes resolved through People’s Mediation Committees 
until 2004.14  As Table 1 and Figure 1 show, the total number of cases 
resolved through People’s Mediation Committees decreased each year 
from 1994 to 2004.15   Compared to other institutions engaged in dispute 
resolution, however, the modest rise in the total number of court cases 
appears less significant.  Disputes and complaints of all types have 
increased in China in recent years, 16  and thus any increase in court 
caseloads may simply be part of the more general increase in both 
disputes and grievances.   For example, far more grievances are raised 
through the letters and visits system than through the courts.17  As Table 1 
and Figure 1 show, the total number of complaints raised to court letters 
and visits offices is only slightly below the number of cases heard.  
Commercial arbitration cases, including both domestic and international 
disputes, increased by more than twenty percent annually from 2004 to 
2006.18  Labor arbitration cases more than quintupled between 1996 and 
                                                   
14 The number of disputes resolved through People’s Mediation Committees grew in 2005, the 
first increase in more than a decade.  The increase likely reflects renewed state emphasis on 
mediation as part of efforts to construct a “harmonious society.”  People’s mediation 
committees are under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and are distinct from court-
supervised mediation, which occurs in the context of litigation. 
15 For a discussion of the weakening of informal dispute resolution, including mediation, in 
Chengdu in recent years, see Di si jie Chengdu fayuan yuanzhang luntan, Qu Ying yuanzhang 
kaimu zhici [The Fourth Chengdu Court Presidents’ Forum, Opening Remarks from President 
Qu Ying], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Oct. 18, 2004, 
http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/yzlt/ [hereinafter The fourth Chengdu court].  People’s Mediation 
Committees operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and local justice bureaux, 
not the courts.   Mediation of cases brought in court also decreased throughout the 1990s, but 
appears to have increased recently due to renewed emphasis on mediation by the Supreme 
People’s Court.  See infra text accompanying note 48. 
16 See The fourth Chengdu court, supra note 16.  
17 The letters and visits system, or xinfang, refers to offices that exist at most levels of the 
Party-state and at most central Party and government departments to handle both written and 
in-person complaints.  Although the total number of complaints raised is not made public, the 
system handles an enormous volume of grievances each year.  For a full discussion of the 
letters and visits system, see Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to the Formal Chinese 
Legal System, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 103-179 (2006). 
18 Wen Jie, 2006 Niandu quanguo zhongcai anjian shouli shuju jianxi [Brief Analysis of the 
Arbitration Cases Decided Nationally in 2006], ZHONGGUO ZHONGCAI WANG [CHINA 
ARBITRATION WEB], Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.china-
arbitration.com/readArticle.do?id=ff80818111440b34011153d7086a0046; Wen Yan, 2005 
nian quanguo ge zhongcai weiyuanhui shouli anjian qingkuang [Statistics of Cases Decided 
by Arbitration Committees Nationwide in 2005], ZHONGGUO ZHONGCAI WANG [CHINA 
ARBITRATION WEB], Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.china-
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2004.19  In addition, Chinese scholars have argued that recourse to social 
networks and to government departments and officials remains a 
preferred method of dispute resolution, in particular in rural China.20  The 
fact that the number of disputes and complaints raised in other institutions 
has continued to rise suggests that the decrease in the growth of litigation 
has not resulted from increased clarity of legal norms.   
 
B.  Top-Down Reform 
 
Modest growth in caseloads does appear to reflect a conscious 
decision by Party-state leaders to strengthen the courts’ ability to resolve 
an increasing number of disputes. 21   But the Party-state has also 
emphasized reforming other dispute resolution institutions – including the 
letters and visits system, mediation, arbitration, and administrative 
review.  These moves suggest that the Party-state is focused on the need 
to resolve disputes and grievances, and thus preserve social stability.  But 
they do not necessarily reflect a trend toward an increased role for the 
courts in comparison to other institutions. 
 Court reform has, however, received enormous attention over the 
past decade. China commenced its project of court reform when it began 
reconstruction of its legal system in 1978.  The role of the courts received 
increased attention in the late 1990s, as China’s leadership renewed 
efforts to strengthen the legal system.  Following the embrace of “rule of 
law” by the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1997, the 
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) in 1999 issued its first five-year plan for 
reforming China’s courts.22  Judicial reform had been a major issue of 
                                                                                                                        
arbitration.com/3a1.asp?id=1772&name=%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E5%8A%A8%E6%
80%81. 
19 MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY, ZHONGUO LAODONG TONGJI NIANJIAN (2005) 
[YEARBOOK OF CHINA LABOR STATISTICS (2005)] 523-524, available at 
http://www.molss.gov.cn/images/2006-11/16/27110316153762520791.pdf. 
20 Guo Xinghua and Wang Ping, Zhongguo nongcun de jiufen yu jiejue tujing: guanyu 
zhongguo nongcun falü yishi yu falü xingwei de shizheng yanjiu [Disputes and Resolution 
Methods in Rural China: Empirical Research on Legal Consciousness and Legal Action in 
Rural China], 2004 JIANGSU SHEHUI KEXUE [JIANGSU SOCIAL SCIENCE] 2, available at 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=3609. 
21 For example, see Jiang Zemin, Report to the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China, Sept. 12, 1997, http://dcdj.ccp.org.cn/old/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=3395 (discussing 
judicial reform); Xin Chunying, supra note 9 (arguing that courts should be the ultimate 
authority for dispute resolution). 
22 The SPC serves as the highest court and also manages the court bureaucracy.   More than 
three hundred judges work at the court, although not all hear cases. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan de 
zhize quanxian yu gongzuo yuanze [The SPC’s power and working principle], ZHONGGUO 
WANG [CHINA WEB], http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-08/13/content_1024700.htm.  
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discussion beginning in the early 1990s,23 but the five-year plan brought 
increased attention to the need to strengthen the courts.  The plan set forth 
fifty goals. 24   In late 2005 the SPC issued a second five-year plan, 
covering the period 2004-2008, again listing fifty goals.25   
Both plans address problems in the courts, ranging from judicial 
training to regularity in court procedures.  Thus, for example, the 2005 
plan calls for reforms to trial procedures and rules of evidence; clarifying 
procedural requirements for rehearings; addressing problems with 
enforcement; reforming the composition of adjudication committees; 
strengthening mediation and the use of simplified trial procedures; 
improving courts’ management of cases; improving training and 
discipline; and reforming the system by which judges’ performance is 
assessed.  Such reforms are largely either general and overly abstract, or 
are primarily technical changes designed to address competence and 
fairness, not courts’ authority or influence over other state actors.  
The goals of the 2005 plan, although similar in number, also 
appear modest when compared to the 1999 plan. 26   The 1999 plan 
included not only specific goals but also details regarding the schedule for 
accomplishing such goals and the mechanisms for doing so; in contrast, 
the 2005 reform speaks only in declaratory terms.  The earlier plan also 
embraced some quite significant reforms, including the creation of rules 
of evidence and the separation within courts of the acceptance of cases 
from adjudication and adjudication of cases from enforcement.  With one 
exception – the reform of procedures for capital cases – the 2005 reforms 
include no major breakthroughs.  Instead, the plan largely reflects 
changes already underway in the courts. 
The 2005 plan does mention the need to address centralizing court 
appointments – a step toward breaking the link between local authorities, 
which generally control court appointments, and judges.  But the plan 
proposes doing so only within “given areas,” not nationally.  And it raises 
the topic of centralized financing of courts, but proposes no specific steps 
toward this goal.  The plan also states that courts should receive 
                                                   
23 Zhang Zhiming, Sifa gaige xuyao geng kuankuo de shiye: dui Zuigao Fayuan wunian gaige 
gangyao de yidian pinglun [Judicial Reform Needs a Broader View: Some Comments on the 
SPC’s Five Year Reform Program], ZHONGGUO FAZI WANG [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW, 
CHINA], http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=256 (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
24 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, RENMIN FAYUAN WUNIAN GAIGE GANGYAO [THE FIVE-YEAR 
PROGRAM FOR REFORM OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS], Oct. 20, 1999, available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=23701.  
25 RENMIN FAYUAN DIERGE WUNIAN GAIGE GANGYAO (2004-2008) [THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR REFORM 
PLAN OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2004-2008)], supra note 4. 
26 Although the plan covers the period 2004-2009, it was not made public until 2005.  The 
delay may reflect internal division regarding the contents of the plan. 
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supervision from People’s Congresses and reiterates that procurators may 
participate in court adjudication committees.27  Given the constitutional 
status of the procuracy and the people’s congresses,28 such statements may 
simply be an acknowledgment that reform must take place within existing 
constitutional constraints, but they also may reflect the SPC’s attempt to 
make clear that reform is not designed significantly to expand court 
power or autonomy, and that external oversight of and intervention in 
court work continues to be legitimate.  
Despite the limited goals of the official plans, courts have 
undertaken significant reforms designed to strengthen both the 
competence of judges and the professionalism of the court system.  Most 
significantly, the education levels of judges have improved dramatically.  
Media reports in mid-2005 stated that, for the first time, more than fifty 
percent of Chinese judges had university degrees.29  This marks a sharp 
increase from 6.9 percent in 1995.  Since 2002, all new judges in China 
have been required to possess bachelors degrees.30  Likewise, in 2002 the 
Supreme People’s Court stated that sitting judges who were below age 
forty would be required to obtain a degree within five years or would lose 
their jobs.  Older judges who lacked a university education would be 
                                                   
27 Adjudication committees, which exist in all courts, discuss and resolve difficult or sensitive 
cases, sometimes upon their own instigation and sometimes when cases are referred to the 
committee by the panel hearing the case.  Adjudication committee members – who generally 
do not hear the cases they decide --include court presidents and vice-presidents and other 
senior judges within a court.  The provision in the Five Year Plan is notable because although 
courts have in the past had the discretion to include procuratorates in adjudication committee 
discussions (without voting power), it appears that in practice courts rarely do so.   
28 The PRC Constitution makes explicit that both the SPC and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate are “responsible to the National People’s Congress.”  XIAN FA arts. 128, 133 
(P.R.C.).  The Constitution also states that the courts, procurators and public security bureaux 
shall coordinate their efforts in handling criminal cases, thus perhaps providing support for the 
inclusion of procurators in court adjudication committees.  Both the courts and the 
procuratorates are to exercise their power independently, defined as “not subject to 
interference by administrative organs, public organizations, or individuals.”  Id. arts. 126, 131, 
135.  Such phrasing is generally understood to permit supervision of the courts and 
procuratorates by people’s congresses, the Party, and each other.   
29 Woguo faguan he jianchaguan zhengti suzhi tigao benke bili guoban [The Overall Quality 
of Our Nation’s Judges and Procurators is Raised, More than Half are University Graduates], 
RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], July 17, 2005, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/17/content_3228617.htm.  The source of and 
methodology used to calculate the figure is unclear.  It is likely that the fifty percent number 
includes not only graduates of four-year universities, but also graduates of evening classes, 
junior colleges, or da zhuan (大专), as well as judges who have received university degrees 
through correspondence courses.  These degrees are not necessarily in law.  Gao Yifei, 
Xiaoxue biye dang faguan: wenti daodi zai nali [Becoming a Judge with Only an Elementary 
School Education: What’s the Problem?], JINGJI YU FA WANG [ECONOMICS AND LAW WEB], 
May 7, 2005, http://www.jjyf.com/webpage/news/050218/fg.htm. 
30 Judges Law, art. 9. 
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permitted to stay on only if they completed a six-month or one-year 
training course.31  The courts have placed extensive emphasis on training 
judges, with tens of thousands of judges undergoing specialized legal 
training each year.32  Many new judges, in particular at higher-level courts 
in major cities, now possess graduate degrees in law.   New judges in 
China are also now required to pass the national unified judicial exam, 
which has had a pass rate of roughly ten percent in the past five years.  
Those who became judges before 2002, however, are not required to pass 
the bar exam.33  Court presidents − who generally are the most powerful 
figures within courts and who take part in deciding major or sensitive 
cases − likewise are not required to be judges or to pass the bar exam.34  
The SPC has also taken steps to improve the quality of court 
decisions.  In 2005 the SPC issued a notice stating that opinions should 
include both accurate descriptions of the facts and evidence and logical 
arguments and legal reasoning.35   In so doing, the SPC appeared to agree 
                                                   
31 Wenping shangqu budengyu shuiping tigao, faguan peixun buneng zhi benzhe wenping qu 
[An Advanced Degree Does Not Equal Enhanced Ability, Judge’s Training Should Not Solely 
Aim at Degrees], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA WEB], Mar. 11, 2004, 
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/11/content_1360136.htm.  Obtaining such 
training, however, appears relatively easy. 
32 Id.; Hua Xuan, Zhiye faguan bailian chenggang [Professional Judges Being Tempered Into 
Steel], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Oct. 16, 2002, 
http://www.snweb.com/gb/people_daily/2002/10/16/j1016003.htm. 
33 An SPC notice implementing the Judges Law also states that persons who are not judges 
may not be appointed to positions on court adjudication committees or as heads of divisions 
within courts without first passing the bar exam. 
34 Su Zelin, Zou you Zhongguo tese de jingying faguan zhi lu [Taking the Route to Elite Judges 
with Special Chinese Characteristics], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], June 
26, 2002, http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=5672; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
guanyu guanche luoshi “Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo faguan fa” de tongzhi [Notice of the 
Supreme People’s Court Regarding Implementation of the ‘Judges Law’ of the People’s 
Republic of China], July 11, 2001, 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=38471. 
35 Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu zai quanguo fayuan minshi he 
xingzheng shenpan bumen kaizhan ‘Guifan sifa xingwei, cujin sifa gongzheng’ zhuanxiang 
zhenggai huodong de tongzhi [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court regarding implementing 
the ‘Standardizing judicial acts, enhancing judicial justice’ special alteration and correction 
movement in the civil and administrative divisions of courts nationwide], July 15, 2005, 
http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/gj/21/6677.html.  SPC President Xiao Yang likewise has stated 
that courts should give more attention to including legal reasoning in court opinions.  Xiao 
Yang zai Henan sheng kaocha fayuan gongzuo shi yaoqiu fayuan yaowei goujian hexie shehui 
tigong youli sifa baozhang [While inspecting courts’ work in Henan, Xiao Yang requests that 
courts provide effective judicial safeguards for the construction of a harmonious society], 
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Feb. 24, 2006, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/news/bulletin/release/200602240017.htm.  Similarly, both the SPC 
and local courts have issued statements on the importance of improving the quality of court 
opinions.  Quanguo fayuan jiang shixing anjian zhiliang guanli zhidu jianshao shenli chacuo 
[Courts Nationwide will Implement a Quality Control System to Reduce Mistaken Decisions], 
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with arguments from scholars that improving the quality of court opinions 
would boost public confidence in the courts and facilitate court efforts to 
resist interference.36  The Supreme People’s Court has also taken repeated 
steps to crack down on corruption.37  
The higher education levels of judges and the attention to well-
reasoned opinions appear to be yielding results.  Judges comment that 
greater competence in the judiciary increases the ability of courts to resist 
external pressure by relying on legal arguments or well-reasoned 
opinions. 38   In addition, judges say that whereas in the past such 
intervention might have come either formally, in the form of written 
instructions (pi tiaozi) or through telephone calls, courts increasingly are 
swayed only by written instructions.  Many such instructions tell courts to 
“emphasize” a case, or handle a particular case “according to law,” rather 
than dictating outcomes, although even instructions in such form may 
make clear the desired outcome.  It is difficult to assess whether 
interference in China’s courts is increasing or decreasing.  Some in China 
argue that external interference in the courts is actually growing, 
reflecting both falling confidence in the courts and the rise of the 
importance of popular opinion and social protest as means of influencing 
the courts.  Others note that courts are playing more important roles than 
in the past – hence the greater need for intervention.  But it does appear 
that courts confronted by such pressures are increasingly likely to try to 
use legal arguments to resist.   
Most public discussion of interference on court decision-making 
focuses on the need to reduce corruption and opportunities for corruption, 
not intervention by Party officials.39  But limited evidence does suggest 
                                                                                                                        
YANGSHI GUOJI [CCTV INTERNATIONAL], June 30, 2004, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-06/30/content_1557006.htm; Chengdu fayuan: tong an 
butong pan? kan kan ‘yangban an’ [Chengdu Courts: Same Cases, Different Decisions? Look 
at ‘Model Cases’], SICHUAN XINWEN WANG [SICHUAN NEWS NET], Apr. 23, 2005, available at 
http://cn.news.yahoo.com/050423/159/2b82x.html. 
36 For example, see Fu Yulin, Minshi caipan wenshu de gongneng yu fengge [Function and 
Style of Civil Cases Decisions], 2000 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCES] 4, 
available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=22445. 
37 For an example, see Zuigaofa jiuxiang cuoshi jiaqiang zhidu fanfu, jian ‘si bu wei’ jizhi 
[Nine Measures of the SPC for Enhancing the Anti-Corruption System, Establishing the ‘Four 
Forbidden Acts’ Regime], ZHONGGUO PUFA WANG [CHINA LEGAL EDUCATION WEB], Mar. 30, 
2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2005-03/30/content_2762253.htm. 
38 Interviews. 
39 Recent steps in Beijing to fight judicial corruption prohibit six forms of private contact 
between judges and lawyers, including private meetings, attending non-official activities 
together, or receiving payments.  The regulations generated controversy, with some academics 
arguing that such conduct was already prohibited, that the regulations were too general, and 
that the regulations would fail to have any significant effect.  Zhai Jingmin, Zhuo Zeyuan, He 
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that increased awareness of law and better training of judges may, over 
time, make it easier for judges to respond to some forms of external 
pressure.  Likewise, judges in some intermediate and higher courts state 
that they now refuse to answer inquiries (qingshi) from lower-court 
judges about how pending cases in lower courts should be handled unless 
such requests are in writing.  Some intermediate and higher courts now 
require such requests to come from court adjudication committees. 
Intervention continues, however, and continues to be a legitimate 
action by Party officials.  Decreased direct intervention in cases may 
reflect greater respect for the courts.40  But greater political sophistication 
in the courts may also make direct intervention by officials outside the 
courts less necessary, because courts are well aware of the cases most 
likely to be of concern to Party leaders.  Judges recognize the need to 
balance legal requirements with powerful interests.  Officials seeking to 
pressure the courts may also have mechanisms for doing so other than 
direct intervention.   Improvements have been greater in routine cases 
than in politically sensitive ones.  For example, judges comment that they 
are rarely under pressure in intellectual property cases because these cases 
do not touch on core Party interests.  But the scope of sensitive cases 
remains wide and can include not only major criminal or political cases, 
but also cases involving the financial interests of either the Party-state or 
individuals with Party-state ties, cases involving high profile companies, 
those involving a large number of potential plaintiffs, and cases receiving 
extensive media coverage. 
Not all reforms have been as successful as the efforts to boost 
education and training.  Notably, court leaders have repeatedly 
emphasized the need to address the problems courts face in enforcing 
their decisions.  Nevertheless, lack of enforcement continues to be a 
major problem,41 with one report stating that as many as thirty percent of 
                                                                                                                        
Weifang and You Zhenhui, Toushi Beijing shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan ‘liutiao jinling’ 
[Perspectives on the Beijing High People's Court’s ‘six bans’],  
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Aug. 26, 2004, available at 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/xwzx/2004-08/26/content_128630.htm.  
40 Judges acknowledge that they may not always be aware of intervention in cases:  officials or 
other interested parties seeking to influence courts often contact court presidents or vice-
presidents, who then may exert influence over outcomes without indicating that there has been 
external pressure. 
41 Zuigao Fayuan huiying sida jiaodian huati: sixing fuhe, zhixing nan… [SPC Replies to Four 
Hot Topics: Death Penalty Review, Difficulty of Enforcement…], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA 
NET], Mar. 11, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2006-
03/11/content_4289573.htm; Zhongwai sifajie shouci xieshou yantao zhixing chengxu gaige 
[The First Cooperation Between Chinese and Foreign Judiciaries on the Study of Reforms to 
the Enforcement Process], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], July 12, 2005, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/12/content_3208267.htm. 
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all civil cases are not enforced.42  The number of enforcement decisions 
issued by courts almost doubled between 1994 and 2004.  The increase 
likely reflects greater court emphasis on enforcing decisions – but it may 
also be a sign of the continued tendency of many litigants to ignore court 
judgments against them.  Local court judges acknowledge that 
enforcement of judgments continues to be a major challenge.43   
Difficulties enforcing decisions reflect problems that courts 
cannot address on their own: local protectionism, continued intervention 
in cases by Party-state officials and administrative departments, an 
undeveloped credit system, and weak punishment for non-compliance 
with court orders.  In an acknowledgement of the continuing difficulties 
in enforcement, the Party’s Central Political-Legal Committee issued a 
notice in December 2005 calling for the cooperation of the police and the 
procuracy in the enforcement of court judgments and for the 
establishment of a comprehensive enforcement information system that 
involves government departments overseeing banks, real estate, vehicles 
and other sectors.44  Similarly, repeated official statements regarding the 
importance of combating corruption in the judiciary suggest that 
corruption continues to be a major problem, one that reflects the difficulty 
of strengthening the authority of courts so long as they remain subject to 
extensive external influence. 
One response of courts to problems in enforcement has been 
renewed stress on mediation by the courts. 45  In 2004, the SPC issued a 
notice emphasizing the importance of mediation.46  The most recent SPC 
                                                   
42 He Cong, Facilitating Property Execution, CHINA DAILY WEB, Nov. 30, 2004, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/30/content_395807.htm. One 2006 report 
stated that sixty percent of the enforcement cases in the Beijing Second Intermediate Court 
could not be enforced at all; another twenty percent could be enforced only in part.  Zhao Lei, 
Zuigaoyuan yanzhong de ‘zhiben zhi ce’ fuchu [The SPC’s ‘Strategy for Addressing the 
Roots’ Floats Out”], NANFANG ZHOUMOU [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], July 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20060706/xw/szxw1/200607060008.asp. 
43 Interviews. 
44 Zhongyang Zhengfawei: Dongyuan shehui liliang, qieshi jiejue zhixing nan [Central 
Political-Legal Committee: Mobilize the Resources of Society, Conscientiously Solve the 
Problem of Enforcing Judgments], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], Jan. 23, 2006, available at 
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-01/23/content_4090238.htm. 
45 Similarly, the Ministry of Justice, which oversees People’s Mediation Committees, has 
reemphasized the importance of mediation in serving the interests of building a “harmonious 
society.”  Sifabu biaozhang mintiao gongzuo ‘shuangxian’ [Ministry of Justice Commends the 
‘Two Advances’ in People’s Mediation Work], Mar. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/moj/jcgzzds/2005-05/17/content_133971.htm. 
46 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan minshi tiaojie gongzuo ruogan wenti de 
jueding [Decision of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Some Questions Relating to Civil 
Mediation by People’s Courts], Sept. 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200409/20040916181153.htm. 
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work report stated that courts are continuing to emphasize mediation as a 
means of reducing contradictions and conflict in society.  The report 
stated that thirty percent of all civil cases were resolved through 
mediation in 2006, and that fifty-five percent of first-instance civil cases 
were mediated or withdrawn prior to judgment. 47   Many judges, in 
particular those in basic level courts, comment that the percentage of 
cases resolved through court mediation is now increasing, after declining 
throughout the 1990s.  Judges cite two primary reasons for renewed 
attention to mediation:  mediated decisions are more likely to be enforced 
than are adjudicated cases, and mediated cases are less likely to result in 
protests and complaints. 
Some reforms may actually encourage intervention in decisions 
by higher-ranking judges or officials.  For example, an SPC decision 
issued in 2001 stated that court presidents and vice-presidents will be 
forced to resign if their courts issue illegal decisions that harm state or 
public interests, fail to investigate or reveal serious cases of wrongdoing 
sufficiently, or fail to engage in oversight over their courts.48  The rules 
reflect the fact that judicial independence in China refers to the 
independence of courts, not individual judges.  Although courts are 
expected to be free from interference from other administrative actors, 
individual judges are not expected to decide cases in isolation.  Court 
presidents are responsible for decisions in their courts, even though they 
generally do not hear such cases.  Likewise, discussions about a pending 
case with judges who did not participate in hearing the case, or with 
superiors within courts, are legitimate.  Nevertheless, scholars have 
criticized the regulations for encouraging court presidents – who often 
have close ties to local officials – to intervene in pending cases in their 
courts.49   
Such reforms also highlight the continuing importance of court 
presidents, whose appointments generally continue to be controlled by the 
local Party-state.  Many, and perhaps most, court presidents lack formal 
                                                   
47 2007 SPC WORK REPORT.    
48  Difang geji renmin fayuan ji zhuanmen renmin fayuan yuanzhang, fu yuanzhang yinjiu 
cizhi guiding (shixing) [Rule Regarding Accepting Blame and Resigning for Presidents and 
Vice Presidents of All Levels of Local Courts and Special Courts (interim)], Nov. 6, 2001, 
available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-11/07/content_26864.htm. 
49 Su Li, Zhongguo sifa gaige luoji de yanjiu: ping Zuigao Fayuan de ‘yinjiu cizhi guiding’ [A 
Study on the Logic of Chinese Judicial Reform: Comments on the SPC’s Rule Regarding 
Taking the Blame and Resigning], FALU SIXIANG WANG [LAW THINKER NET], Dec. 31, 2005, 
available at http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=3023.  Scholars also argued that the rules 
violated the constitution – which vests control of appointment and removal of court presidents 
in people’s congresses, not in superior courts.  He Weifang, Sifa gaige de kongjian tuozhan 
[The Expanding Space of Judicial Reform], BEIDA FALU XINXI WANG [CHINA LAW INFO], Mar. 
2, 2006, available at http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/pages/2006-3-2/s33846.html. 
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legal training or experience in the courts. The failure to reform the system 
of appointments of court presidents continues to serve as a major 
impediment to strengthening the courts.  Similarly, the court 
responsibility system, pursuant to which judges may be fined or removed 
from office for decisions that are altered or reversed on appeal, 
encourages judges to seek guidance on handling individual cases from 
their superiors – both within their court and in higher courts.50 
 
C. Depoliticization? 
 
Courts continue to be subject to Party leadership.  Nevertheless, 
prior to 2006 there appeared to be some steps toward reducing the 
political role of courts.  Scholars in China have argued that the courts 
have gradually shifted from primarily serving as political tools in criminal 
campaigns in the early 1980s to focusing on providing justice in 
individual cases today.51  These trends do not apply in politically sensitive 
cases, where courts often have little say in the final outcomes.  But 
China’s courts have at times appeared to signal that they are no longer 
solely political tools of the state.  Court rhetoric has changed over the past 
decade, reflecting a modest attempt by the courts to shift from being a 
tool for enforcing Party policy to being a neutral forum for dispute 
resolution.  Thus, for example, the SPC’s 1996 Work Report emphasized 
the court’s role in carrying out the Party’s “strike hard” campaign against 
crime and noted a number of important cases in which defendants were 
sentenced to death.  In contrast, the 2006 report, although stating that the 
courts continue to work to “uphold Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three 
Represents under the leadership of Communist Party Secretary General 
Hu Jintao,” also noted the importance of courts being impartial and 
protecting the human rights of criminal defendants.52   Many judges have 
replaced their military-style uniforms with robes – a change viewed as a 
                                                   
50 The system may also discourage higher courts from fully addressing incorrect decisions on 
appeal, as they may be reluctant to take action that could result in punishment to lower court 
judges.   
51 Yu Zhong, Lun Zuigao Renmin Fayuan shiji chengdan de zhengzhi gongneng: yi Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan linian ‘gongzuo baogao’ wei yiju [On the Actual Political Function of the 
Supreme People’s Court: Using the Annual “Work Report” of the Supreme People’s Court as 
a Base], 7 QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA LEGAL STUDIES], available at http://law-
thinker.com/show.asp?id=2829 (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).  
52 2006 SPC WORK REPORT.  Other recent reports have used similar language.  For a 
discussion of changes in the reports, see Chen Ruihong, Sifa yu minzhu: Zhongguo sifa 
minzhuhua jiqi pipan [Judiciary and Democracy: The Democratization of the Chinese 
Judiciary and its Critique] BEIDA FALU XINXI WANG [CHINA LAW INFO], available at 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=2638 (last visited 
July 1, 2006). 
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step forward by some academics who praise such changes as a way of 
signaling that judges and courts are not simply another branch of the 
Party-state. 53   Likewise, the new education requirements for judges 
represent a shift away from primary reliance on political backgrounds in 
selecting members of the judiciary.54 
It would be a mistake to read too much into these trends.  
Emphasis on the rights of defendants may represent a shift in Party 
policy, rather than a reduced political function for the courts.  
Depoliticisation in the courts also results from the broadening range of 
disputes in the courts; compared to the past, courts today confront a much 
greater number of cases that do not touch on sensitive issues.  Courts do 
not appear more likely to challenge Party authority than in the past.  
Indeed, depoliticisation – to the degree it has occurred – may be possible 
precisely because courts are not a challenge to Party authority.  Local 
Party organizations continue to oversee court appointments, court 
presidents are often primarily chosen for political reasons, and the 
overwhelming majority of judges continue to be Party members.55  Within 
the Party hierarchy, the President of the Supreme People’s Court ranks 
well below the Minister of Public Security, a pattern generally replicated 
at the local level.56  Party leaders may desire that courts be fairer and more 
efficient, but there is little sign of intent to transform the courts’ position 
in the Chinese political structure.   
                                                   
53 Ganshou sifa zunyan: chuan fapao qiao fachui xingshi beihou de yiyi hezai [Feeling the 
Honor of the Judiciary: What’s the Meaning Behind the Actions of Wearing Robes and Hitting 
Gavels], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], June 5, 2002, available at 
http://news3.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-06/05/content_425067.htm; Renmin fayuan 
faguanpao chuanzhuo guiding [People’s Courts Rules on Wearing Judges’ Robes], Jan. 24, 
2002, available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200311/20031109141209.htm; Renmin 
fayuan fachui shiyong guiding [People’s Courts Rules on Using Gavels], Dec. 24,  2001, 
available at http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200311/20031109141310.htm.  Although the 
SPC originally called for all judges to adopt robes, basic level judges in many areas have not 
done so. 
54 Xin, supra note 9.  For an argument that China’s courts are transforming “from a military 
instrument of proletarian dictatorship to a professional legal institution,” see Sida Liu, Beyond 
Global Convergence: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a Lower Chinese Court, 31 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 75, 75-106 (2006). 
55 One recent report stated that eighty percent of judges are Party members.  Wang Mingyi, 
Faguan duiwu dangyuan xianjinxing jianshe yao tuchu liangzhi jiaoyu [The Advanced 
Construction of the Corps of Party-Member Judges Must Project Moral Education], 
ZHONGGUO FAGUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], July 17, 2006, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200607/17/211694.shtml. 
56 Similarly, the less ambitious nature of the second five-year plan may suggest that the courts, 
or court leaders, are less influential in the Party structure than they were even a few years ago.  
Within the government hierarchy, however, the reverse is the case:  the SPC President has the 
rank of a Deputy Premier, while the Minister of Public Security has the lower rank of full 
minister. 
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Courts’ loyalty to the Party was re-emphasized in 2006 with the 
launching of a new campaign on “socialist rule of law theory” in the 
courts, procuratorates, justice bureaux, and public security bureaux.  
Under the slogan of “Education on Socialist Rule of Law Theory,” judges 
nationwide are being instructed in the importance of following Party 
leadership.  The campaign began with a speech by Luo Gan ( 干罗 ), head 
of the Party’s Central Political-Legal Committee, in which he stated that 
the goals of the campaign were to guarantee the legal and political 
system’s  “political color” and loyalty to the Party, the nation, the people, 
and the law.  The five elements of the campaign include “ruling the 
country by law,” “implementing law for the people,” “maintaining 
fairness and justice,” “serving the overall situation,” and “following the 
leadership of the Party.”57  In the speech Luo appeared to be drawing a 
distinction between “rule of law” and “socialist rule of law,” with the 
latter emphasizing the legal system’s obligation to follow Party 
leadership, and in particular Hu Jintao’s theory of a “harmonious 
society.”  The speech may also signal a renewed attempt to use law to 
reassert central control over local governments.  The SPC has instructed 
all courts nationwide to educate judges in these principles.58  In a follow-
up speech, Cao Jianming, vice-president of the Supreme People’s Court, 
linked the campaign to the need to avoid the “negative influence of 
Western rule of law theory”59 – an apparent reference to those within and 
                                                   
57 Luo Gan zai shehui zhuyi fazhi linian yantaoban shang qiangdiao: shenru kanzhan shehui 
zhuyi fazhi linian jiaoyu, qieshi jiaqiang zhengfa duiwu sixiang zhengzhi jianshe [Luo Gan 
emphasizes in a symposium on socialist rule of law theory: deepen education on socialist rule 
of law theory, enhance the ideological and political construction among workers in the 
political-legal system], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], 14 Apr., 2006, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=201753.  In a later speech, in November 2006, 
Luo again called for strengthening Party oversight of legal institutions.  He also added a more 
direct critique of those advocating judicial independence and western-style legal reforms.  Luo 
warned against underestimating the influence of such arguments, in particular arguments that 
deny the Party’s leadership of legal and political institutions, on those working in the political-
legal system.  He also stated that “hostile forces” were trying to use legal institutions as an 
entry-point for westernizing and splitting China.  Luo Gan, Zhengfa jiguan zai goujian hexie 
shehui zhong danfu zhongda lishi shiming he zhengzhi zeren [Political and legal institutions 
shoulder an important historical mission and political responsibility in the construction of a 
harmonious society], 2007 QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH] No. 3 (Feb. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20070201/GB/qs%5E448%5E0%5E1.htm. 
58 Xiao Yang zai Zuigao Renmin Fayuan dangzu xuexihui shang qiangdiao: shenru kaizhan 
shehui zhuyi fazhi linian jiaoyu, quebao fayuan duiwu shehui zhuyi zhengzhi bense [Xiao Yang 
emphasizes in the study meeting of the Supreme People’s Court party group: deepen 
education on socialist rule of law theory, ensure the socialist political colour of the court 
system],ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Apr. 27, 2006, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=203189. 
59 Cao Jiaming zai shehui zhuyi fazhi linian yantaoban shang qiangdiao: renmin fayuan yao 
laogu shuli shehui zhuyi fazhi linian [Cao Jianming emphasizes in the symposium on socialist 
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outside of China advocating Western-style judicial independence for 
China.   The speech appeared to be a rare public instance of court officials 
explicitly warning of the need to avoid excessive Western influence in the 
courts.60   
 
III. NEW PRESSURES:  POPULISM, TRANSPARENCY, AND 
INEQUALITY 
 
The recent focus on reinforcing political orthodoxy in the courts 
reflects the modest reach of top-down court reform.  The evolution of 
Chinese society and governance has also resulted in new challenges for 
the courts.  Some of these pressures, notably greater public attention to 
and scrutiny of court actions, may over time result in courts that act more 
fairly and with greater competence.  But new pressures on the courts also 
demonstrate that recent reforms have not fundamentally altered courts’ 
roles or their relationships to other institutions.  This section discusses 
five trends that reflect new pressures on the courts and that threaten to 
undermine their already fragile authority. 
 
A. Media Pressure 
 
Over the past decade China’s courts have confronted increasingly 
aggressive and influential media.   China’s media have long been far 
more powerful actors in the Chinese political system than the courts, 
serving both as the mouthpiece and as the “eyes and ears” of the Party.  
The growth of commercial media in the 1990s allowed the media to 
combine their traditional official role with marketized mass appeal.  This 
included expanded coverage of the legal system.  Likewise, the growth of 
                                                                                                                        
rule of law theory: the people’s courts must steadily establish socialist rule of law theory], 
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Apr. 14, 2006, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=201755.  Cao also spoke of the need to avoid 
“extreme ‘left’ thoughts” and the “remnants of feudalism.”  Cao’s speech appeared primarily 
aimed at placing the courts in line with current Party ideology.  Doing so may be designed to 
insulate the courts from criticism for excessive reliance on Western models.  But such 
comments also reflect the SPC’s move away from aggressively promoting court reform. 
60 Cao’s language was, however, very similar to language used by Luo Gan in an article in the 
Party’s flagship magazine, Qiushi, suggesting that Cao was simply using the language adopted 
by the Party’s Central Political-Legal Committee.  Luo Gan, Shenru kazhan shehui zhuyi fazhi 
linian jiaoyu, qieshi jiaqiang zhengfa duiwu sixiang zhengzhi jianshe [Deeply develop 
education on socialist rule of law theory, earnestly strengthen the construction of political 
thought among political and legal personnel], 2006 QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH] No. 12.  Both 
Cao’s speech and Luo’s article appeared primarily aimed at placing the courts in line with 
current Party ideology.  For Cao, doing so may also reflect a defensive move designed to 
insulate the courts from criticism for excessive reliance on Western models. 
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investigative journalism and “popular opinion supervision” by the still 
Party-controlled media included a significant volume of critical reporting 
on the courts.   The internet has facilitated such coverage, with news on 
major cases spreading rapidly online and courts finding it more difficult 
to block critical reporting.61   
The media are playing an important role in exposing injustice and 
in pressuring courts to behave fairly.   Media coverage can force courts to 
address long-ignored cases and to follow procedural and substantive legal 
standards.  Legal aid and public interest lawyers, for example, comment 
that having the media on one’s side is often the most important factor 
leading to a successful lawsuit.  Judges comment that it is far more 
difficult to conceal incorrect or unfair decisions than in the past.   
At the same time, media coverage also reinforces Party oversight 
of the courts.  Media coverage of cases and media efforts to stir-up and 
claim to represent popular opinion can lead officials to intervene in cases.  
Officials do so either formally, through written instructions, or 
informally, through telephone calls and discussions with court leaders.  
This is particularly true in criminal cases, where media coverage and 
claims to represent populist demands for justice can lead courts to treat 
criminal defendants harshly.    Judges complain that there is little they can 
do to resist media pressure, even when media views are inconsistent with 
substantive or procedural law.   
The ability of the media to influence the courts reflects the fact 
that the media have long been more influential actors than the courts.  
When media and court views diverge, Party leaders appear to continue to 
trust the media more than they do the courts.   In a system in which 
intervention in individual cases by Party officials remains legitimate – 
Party officials are supposed to intervene in cases where the courts appear 
to be going astray, a point made by positive media coverage of 
intervention in the official Party press – even the threat of intervention 
can be sufficient to affect cases.  Deference to media views is accentuated 
by concern for social stability:  the fact that a case is attracting significant 
media and popular attention is often sufficient reason to justify 
intervention, regardless of the underlying dispute.  Media pressure may be 
particularly influential in part because media content remains subject to 
extensive Propaganda Department oversight.  New technologies are 
making such control more difficult for the Party, but in major or sensitive 
cases the media often continue to speak with one voice.  The media’s 
ability to influence the courts, and to do so by stirring-up popular 
                                                   
61 For analysis of court-media relations, see Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?  
The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-157 (2005). 
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sentiment online, reflects the degree to which assuaging popular demands 
for justice remains more important than deciding cases according to legal 
and procedural norms. 
    
B. Petitions and Protests 
 
Courts have also increasingly come under pressure from 
petitioners and protestors.  As Table 1 shows, courts reported handling 
just under four million “letters and visits” in 2005.  The figure includes 
only letters and visits to the courts – and thus excludes complaints about 
the courts raised with other Party-state actors or institutions.62  The 2004 
figure is less than half of the ten million letters and visits handled five 
years earlier, in 1999.  Court officials have suggested that the decline in 
the number of letters and visits reflects improvements in the courts.  In 
fact, the decline likely reflects court concerns with reducing the volume 
of complaints.  In his 2007 Work Report, for example, SPC President 
Xiao Yang noted that letters and visits to lower courts had declined by 
eleven percent in 2006.63  In some local courts the annual evaluation of 
judges’ performance and bonuses now are based in part on the volume of 
letters and visits resulting from individual judges’ cases. 64   In other 
jurisdictions, courts have made it harder for petitions and complaints 
about the courts to be filed, stating that petitions may only be filed with 
higher-level courts.65   
                                                   
62 Complaints raised with the courts generally concern court actions, and in particular cases 
that courts have adjudicated.  Complaints regarding the courts may also be raised with letters 
and visits offices of other Party-state institutions. 
63 2007 SPC WORK REPORT.  Xiao also stated that letters and visits to the SPC decreased by 
nearly five percent.   The report did not provide total figures for letters and visits to the courts 
in 2006. 
64 Beijing fayuan dui zhongda shesu xinfang an jiang shixing lingdao baoan zhidu [Beijing 
courts will implement a system making court leaders responsible for the resolution of major 
litigation-related letters and visits], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG [CHINA NEWS NET], July 28, 
2005, http://news.qq.com/a/20050728/000926.htm; Shandong fayuan chuangxin jizhi jiejue 
shesu xinfang tuchu wenti [Shangdong courts’ innovative system for resolving outstanding 
problems in litigation-related letters and visits], XINHUA WANG SHANDONG PINDAO [XINHUA 
NET SHANDONG CHANNEL], July 28, 2005, 
http://news.sdinfo.net/72339069014638592/20050728/1384196.shtml; Yiqie weile laobaixing: 
Jiangsu sheng Suqian Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan xinfang gongzuo jishi [All for the ordinary 
people: Jiangsu province Suqian Municipality Intermediate People’s Court’s work on letters 
and visits], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Mar. 10, 2006, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=197942. 
65 Jianshao xinfang fasheng, Hebei fayuan shensu anjian shangti yiji guanxia [To minimize 
letters and visits, Hebei courts shift the jurisdiction for handling rehearing petitions to higher-
level courts], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET], Jan. 10, 2006,  
http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200601/10/t20060110_5781631.shtml.  In some courts 
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Despite these statistics and the fact that most petitions and visits 
fail to have any effect on the courts or Party leaders, judges say that 
pressure from letters and visits has increased in recent years and that 
courts are often under pressure from court and Party superiors to resolve 
petitioners’ grievances.  This is the case even when, according to judges, 
such complaints lack legal merit.  Court officials have repeatedly noted 
that dealing with petitions and visits is distracting them from their work 
handling cases and that courts handle nearly as many petitions as they do 
actual cases.66 
Much of the press coverage of the issue in China highlights how 
letters and visits have led courts to alter incorrect decisions or have 
assisted in compelling parties to implement court judgments.67  Judges 
confirm that some petitions and protests do result in courts reexamining 
and correcting erroneous cases. 68   Other accounts, however, note that 
courts have paid petitioners themselves when court decisions fail to 
provide sufficient funds to petitioners.69   Reports have also noted judges’ 
emphasis on solving cases likely to have a major “social impact” so as to 
prevent possible public disruption. 70   Commentators have argued that 
                                                                                                                        
figures on letters and visits include only complaints regarding closed cases, not those still 
pending. 
662003 SPC WORK REPORT; 2004 SPC WORK REPORT.  For an argument that petitions distract 
courts from working on cases, see Zuo Weimin & He Yongjun, Zhengfa chuantong yu sifa 
lixing: yi Zuigao Fayuan xinfang zhidu wei zhongxin de yanjiu [Politics and law, tradition and 
judicial rationality:  research centred on the SPC’s letters and visits system], 2005 SICHUAN 
DAXUE XUEBAO: ZHESHE BAN [JOURNAL OF SICHUAN UNIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHY AND  SOCIAL 
SCIENCE EDITION] No. 1, available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=4523. 
67 Jiangsu Hebei deng sheng bufen qunzhong yueji xinfang shijian diaocha [An investigation 
of skipping-level letters and visits by masses from Jiangsu, Hebei and other provinces], 
LIAOWANG XINWEN ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK WEEKLY], Oct. 30, 2004, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-10/30/content_2156474.htm;  
Zhai Hao, Yu xinfang yu jiandu zhizhong [Put letters and visits under supervision], SHANGHAI 
RENDA [SHANGHAI PEOPLE'S CONGRESS], Feb. 17, 2006, 
http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/25015/4116961.html; Gaohao xinfang nuan minxin [Warm the 
people’s hearts by resolving letters and visits well], YANGSHI GUOJI [CCTV INTERNATIONAL], 
Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.cctv.com/program/fzbjb/20051216/101554.shtml. 
68 Interviews. 
69 “Jinhua Intermediate Court works hard on litigation-related letters and visits.”  Courts have 
also created “judicial relief” funds to assist poor litigants who are unable to enforce judgments 
in their favor. Zuigao fayuan tan tuidong quanguo fanwei nei jianli zhixing jiuzhu jijin 
[Supreme people’s court discusses promoting the establishment of an enforcement relief fund 
nationwide], Jan. 21, 2007, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-01-26/114912148273.shtml.  
70 Id. Likewise, some courts have issued instructions stating that all letters and visits must be 
“resolved” by the judges handling the case – thus resulting in even greater pressure on judges.  
Renmin Fayuan jiang tuixing faguan panhou dayi zhidu: chengban faguan dui dangshiren yiyi 
jingxing jieshi shuoming [The courts will implement a system of judges answering questions 
after decisions:  judges who handle cases will be responsible for explaining their decisions to 
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courts are being forced to change decisions to protect social stability and 
that the letters and visits system is weakening judicial authority.71  Judges 
comment that they sometimes alter decisions, pay parties from court 
funds, or pressure losing parties to pay more money than ordered by the 
court in order to assuage protestors.72   
The ability of protests and petitions to influence court decisions is 
a vicious circle.  Judges know that the more they respond to protests, the 
more they will encourage similar actions by others.  As with media 
influence, courts’ inability to resist popular pressure reflects concern with 
social stability by Party-state officials.  Fear that popular discontent may 
result in unrest encourages officials to respond to such complaints.  
China’s absence of democracy also plays a role: the lack of alternative 
mechanisms for voicing public views encourages those with grievances to 
resort to the letters and visits system and to the media.  Given such 
concerns, convincing protestors to terminate their protests becomes more 
important than following legal and procedural standards. 
Media coverage, protests, and petitions serve to highlight injustice 
in the legal system, and in some cases result in decisions being changed 
and aggrieved parties receiving redress.  But the influence of both the 
letters and visits system and the media sends a powerful message to 
others with grievances that the courts are often not the ultimate arbiters of 
legal disputes.  In sensitive or controversial cases, Party leaders still hold 
sway.  Such influence also undermines courts’ claims to be authoritative 
or to deserve public respect.  Courts are confronting new sources of 
pressure just as they are attempting to broaden their autonomy.  Yet 
increasing court authority and autonomy will require courts to develop the 
ability to resist precisely these forms of pressure.  Many in the courts are 
aware of these trends, and acknowledge that courts must develop the 
ability to resist popular pressure, but at present there are insufficient 
incentives or opportunities for courts to do so. 
 
C. Controlled Transparency 
 
Although courts have made significant rhetorical commitments to 
openness, courts and the legal system continue to lack transparency.    
                                                                                                                        
parties to cases], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Nov. 3, 2005, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=183759. 
71 Woguo xinfang zhidu xianru sichong kunjing mianlin fazhi tiaozhan [Our nation’s letters 
and visits system encounters four difficulties, faces challenges from rule of law], XINHUA 
WANG [XINHUA NET], June 30, 2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-06-
30/12143565398.shtml. 
72 Interviews. 
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Despite repeated statements that opinions will be publicly available,73 
including online, very few courts have actually made all or even sizeable 
numbers of opinions available online.74  Most courts that do so select only 
a small percentage of cases for publication.   In general, decisions remain 
difficult to obtain except through parties to cases, unless they have been 
reported in the media. 
Courts have also imposed new restrictions on the media’s ability 
to report on cases.  Although most cases are technically open to the public 
and to the media, courts frequently restrict access in sensitive cases or 
those that have attracted public attention.  Journalists must obtain 
permission from the court prior to covering a case – meaning that in 
practice courts have discretion to deny entry.   Journalists complain that it 
remains difficult to obtain access to trials and decisions, in particular in 
sensitive or high-profile disputes.  
Rather than embracing transparency, or attempting to balance 
positive and negative consequences of public scrutiny of the courts, 
China’s courts are trying to control media coverage.  Some advocates of 
limited transparency appear to be concerned that too much openness 
might further undermine confidence in the courts, because greater 
transparency would also make clear the severity of problems in China’s 
courts.75   Hence court officials have spoken of the need to increase their 
openness at the same time that they have encouraged court propaganda 
officials to work with the media to ensure positive coverage of the courts. 
76  In Guangdong, for example, a notice from the Provincial High People’s 
Court and Provincial Propaganda Department bans reporting on cases 
prior to court decisions and prohibits the media from publishing views on 
cases that differ from those of the courts, in effect barring criticism.77  
                                                   
73 See, e.g., Wu Jing, Woguo sifa toumingdu chixu tigao [The continual increase in judicial 
transparency in our nation], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Dec. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=188304. 
74  He Weifang, Panjueshu shangwang nan zai hechu [What’s the difficulty in putting court 
decisions online], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://law-
thinker.com/show.asp?id=3025. 
75 For criticism of such arguments, see id.; Jiang Ming’an, Panjueshu shangwang: yao jiji 
tuijin erbushi huanxing [Putting decisions online: it should be pushed actively rather than 
postponed], Apr. 11, 2006, 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/21601/21626/2006/4/zh286412202911460024004-0.htm. 
76 In September 2006, for example, the SPC issued new rules restricting court officials’ 
contact with the media and giving courts the authority to ban media coverage of a range of 
court cases. Vivian Wu, Press quiet on changes to reporting court cases, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 2006. 
77 Journalists who have violated the rules have been banned from reporting on courts in 
Guangdong. Fayuan ‘fengsha’ liu jizhe, yinfa xinwen baodao yu sifa touming taolun [Six 
journalists are ‘blocked’ by court, triggering discussion about judicial transparency], 
JIANGNAN SHIBAO [JIANGNAN TIMES], Dec. 10, 2003, available at 
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Such efforts are not unusual among Chinese Party-state institutions, but 
they are in direct contrast to court claims to be embracing greater 
openness. 
Efforts by the courts to restrict media coverage highlight the fact 
that courts are not passive in the face of external pressure.  Courts have 
also directly retaliated against the media through defamation litigation – 
most often in cases brought by individual judges, but sometimes in cases 
brought by courts themselves.  Such actions show that courts may be 
using their existing authority in new ways so as to resist external pressure.  
 
D. Court Inaction 
 
Courts increasingly deal with difficult or sensitive cases by 
inaction:  cases are refused or left unresolved.   In such cases courts 
appear to hope either that some other state actor will resolve the case or 
that the case will disappear.  Courts have also formally closed their doors 
to certain classes of disputes.  Thus, for example, the Guangxi High 
People’s Court issued a notice in 2004 listing thirteen categories of cases 
that courts in Guangxi will not accept.78  These include real estate disputes 
resulting from government decisions or institutional reforms, claims 
brought by laid-off workers resulting from corporate restructuring, and 
lawsuits resulting from a party’s failure to implement a government 
decision regarding ownership or usage rights in property.  Most of the 
categories relate to government reforms of industry, agriculture, and land; 
some, such as a ban on some classes of securities lawsuits, mirror 
decisions by the Supreme People’s Court.  In practice, courts have long 
refused to accept certain categories of cases; the Guangxi decision is 
unusual primarily because the court made the list of such cases public.  
The decision drew criticism in China from scholars who argued that the 
                                                                                                                        
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-12/10/content_1223333.htm; He Weifang, Fayuan 
ruhe duli yu meiti yingxiang [How will the court be independent from influence of the media], 
ZHONGGUO FUNÜ BAO [CHINA WOMEN’S NEWS], Jan. 19, 2005, available at 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=27893; He Weifang, 
Weishenme fayuan buke fengsha jizhe [Why courts may not block journalists], XINHUA WANG 
[XINHUA NET], Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.legal-history.net/articleshow.asp?id=736; Zhou 
Jialu, Chuanmei yu sifa guanxi de zhidu goujian [Establishing the relationship between the 
media and the judiciary], XINWEN JIZHE [NEWS JOURNALIST], 
http://xwjz.eastday.com/eastday/xwjz/node71701/node71703/userobject1ai1247619.html (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2007). 
78 Guangxi bu shouli 13 lei ruoshi qunti an, sheng gaoyuan cheng you guoqing jueding 
[Guangxi refuses to accept 13 categories of cases relating to disadvantaged people, high court 
asserts it is decided by the situation of the country], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH 
DAILY], Aug. 24, 2004, available at http://news.qq.com/a/20040824/000070.htm. 
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courts cannot refuse claims and cases that are permitted by law.  The fact 
that most of the categories of cases touch on areas of potential social 
unrest is an echo of court concerns with popular pressure through protests 
and the media:  faced with such pressure, courts have apparently decided 
that they may be better off not hearing such cases and leaving decisions to 
other Party-state departments.   
Courts’ decisions to leave contentious or sensitive issues for other 
actors to resolve are understandable.  Many disputes that courts refuse to 
accept are cases that they in practice either could not resolve on their own 
or are cases in which courts would not be able to implement any decisions 
they did make.  Courts would appear to gain little from hearing such cases 
– even if technically such claims are allowed under existing laws.  
Refusing to hear controversial claims also protects the courts from the 
more extensive criticism or pressure they might receive if they ruled in 
such cases.  But doing so reinforces courts’ limited power to resolve 
significant public grievances.     
 
E. Inequality and Shortages of Judges 
 
Growing inequality within the courts threatens further to 
undermine popular confidence in the courts.  Widening inequality in 
Chinese society is being reflected in the courts.   Despite major efforts to 
attract better qualified judges, many courts in China’s interior are finding 
it difficult to attract qualified personnel and are losing existing judges to 
higher paying jobs as lawyers, in particular in more developed areas.    
Although the total number of judges remains large, more than 
200,000,79 court officials have identified the loss of personnel in courts in 
China’s less developed areas as a major problem. 80   In Guizhou, for 
example, the President of the High People’s Court reported that more than 
200 judges resigned between 2001 and 2005 while only eighty new 
personnel passed the bar exam.  The loss of personnel, combined with 
large numbers of judges approaching retirement age, is making it 
increasingly difficult to staff courts: the judge stated that many courts in 
                                                   
79 Estimates of the total number of judges vary, depending on precisely who is counted as a 
judge.  Nevertheless, most figures in recent years have appeared to be in the range of 200,000.  
Some Chinese scholars have argued that China has far too many judges, noting that Chinese 
judges on average handle vastly fewer cases per judge than do their Western counterparts – 
although many Chinese judges are not involved in hearing cases.  See, e.g., Zhang Wusheng, 
Woguo faguan de chongzu yu fenliu yanjiu [Research into the reorganization and 
repositioning of our nation’s judges], 2004 FALÜ KEXUE [LEGAL SCIENCE] No. 3. 
80 2006 SPC WORK REPORT.  
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Guizhou now find it difficult to form a three-judge panel to hear cases.81  
Some commentators have argued that people without university degrees 
should be permitted to take the bar exam in less developed areas in order 
to ensure sufficient numbers of lawyers and judges .82 
Some courts lack sufficient funds to pay new judges.  In Hubei, for 
example, local government budgets allocate only 200 yuan per month per 
judge in salaries in some courts. 83   Even in Beijing, judges’ pay has 
decreased in recent years as a result of reforms that eliminated bonus 
payments to judges for handling specified numbers of cases.  In the past 
judges in Beijing were better paid than those working in other state 
institutions, a reflection of courts’ ability to generate income from 
charging filing and other fees to litigants.84  Such reforms are designed to 
minimize incentives to courts to overcharge litigants and to equalize pay 
among all civil servants.  But they have also resulted in judges leaving to 
pursue more lucrative careers. 
 Unequal development in and staffing of the courts risks further 
weakening court attempts to increase their authority.  Courts that lack 
personnel complain of being overburdened by rising caseloads; some say 
                                                   
81 Zhang Linchun, Zhongxibu diqu sifa jigou rencai liushi wenti yanzhong [The serious 
problem of personnel loss in judicial institutions in central and western regions], XINHUA 
WANG [XINHUA NET], Mar. 13, 2006, 
http://www.lianghui.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/2006lh/1151637.htm.  The report stated that there 
are only 900 judges in the 400 basic level courts in Guizhou province, meaning that on 
average local courts have fewer than 2.5 judges.  For a discussion of similar problems in 
Sichuan province, see Daibiao tan falü rencai duiwu jianshe [Representatives discuss 
construction of legal personnel system], TENGXUN WANG [TENCENT WEB], Mar. 10, 2006, 
http://www.chinalawjob.com/service/hr/11_29_11_372.shtml.  For a discussion of shortages 
of judges in Hubei, see Faguan duanceng zhuangkuang lingren danyou: Yu Lü Zhongmei 
daibiao duihua faguan duanceng weiji [The shortage of judges makes people concerned: 
dialog with representative Lü Zhongmei on the crisis of the shortage of judges], FAZHI WANG 
[LEGAL DAILY WEB], http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/2006-03/08/content_279135.htm (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2007). 
82 Guojia tongyi sifa kaoshi bubi yikao ding qiankun [It’s not necessary for the national bar 
exam to be finally decisive], XINJING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/pages/2005-12-1/s32650.html. 
83 Sifa gaige renzhong daoyuan fayuan jingfei “qianjing” jianming [Judicial reform shoulders 
heavy responsibilities, the “future” of court funds becomes bright], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA 
BUSINESS NEWS], Nov. 14, 2005, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-11-
14/12258293328.shtml; Li Shourong, Guanyu nongcun jiceng fayuan jianshe de diaocha yu 
sikao [Investigation and thoughts on the construction of countryside local courts], Changsha 
Fayuan Wang [Changsha Court Web], Aug. 25, 2005, 
http://cszy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=197.  
84 Beijing gongwuyuan gongzi gaige,“feichai bumen” da shou yingxiang [Civil servants salary 
reform in Beijing: “profitable departments” are impacted in a major way], LIAOWANG 
DONGFANG ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK ORIENTAL], Sept. 8, 2004, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-09/08/content_1956812.htm.  
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they can barely manage to handle all of the cases before them.85  Many 
courts appear unable to attract well-qualified personnel to serve as judges, 
which in turn may harm courts’ ability to resist external pressure and to 
increase public confidence.  A brain drain in the judiciary risks furthering 
popular beliefs that courts are not effective mechanisms for vindicating 
individual rights or redressing grievances.  
 Courts should perhaps not bear too much of the blame for the 
range of new problems that are undermining their authority.  The 
problems reflect the institutional framework in which courts operate.  
These new problems have arisen as officials within the courts have called 
for courts to play greater roles, but reflect the lack of support for broader 
changes from leaders outside the courts.   
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION 
 
Despite these problems, significant change is occurring in China’s 
courts.  But the most important recent developments in China’s courts are 
coming from lower courts, rather than at the behest of the SPC.  Three 
trends are particularly noteworthy:  increased horizontal interactions 
among judges and the use of informal precedent; growing innovation by 
judges; and the use of courts as fora for raising rights-based grievances.   
First, lower courts are increasingly looking to other courts for 
guidance when they encounter new or difficult legal questions.86  In the 
past, courts generally had little option but to consult higher level courts.  
In recent years, however, judges have increasingly looked horizontally, to 
courts of equal rank outside their jurisdictions, for guidance.  Judges from 
a range of regions comment that they routinely consult the internet to 
assist them when they encounter new questions, to learn how courts 
elsewhere have handled similar issues.  In particular, judges in less 
developed areas note that they frequently look to online media reports, 
case summaries, and in some cases decisions posted to court websites to 
learn how other courts have handled cases.  Judges encountering a novel 
question likewise may telephone judges in other courts to discuss how 
they have handled similar cases.  Some judges say that they use email to 
seek advice on pending cases from academics.  Others, in particular those 
in intellectual property tribunals, say that they use the internet to consult 
materials about foreign law and to access foreign cases.   
                                                   
85 Liu Lan & Ying Qiming, Jiceng faguan xinli yali you duoda? [How serious is the mental 
pressure facing local judges?], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS), Feb. 2, 2006, 
available at http://oldfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=93729. 
86 Benjamin L. Liebman & Timothy Wu, Chinese Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 257 
(2007). 
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Such judicial networking, and the development of informal 
patterns of precedent, may lead to more consistent application of the law.  
The growth of the internet may also be facilitating the development of 
professional identity among judges, who increasingly interact online, and 
who appear ever more aware of the challenges similarly situated judges 
face elsewhere in China.87  Greater professional identity among judges is 
unlikely to alter how judges decide sensitive cases, but it may be assisting 
judges as they seek to combat interference from higher-ups both within 
and outside the courts.   Increased professional identity may also result in 
greater frustration among judges who face external interference. 
The growth of horizontal interactions among judges is particularly 
significant because it contrasts with top-down court reform.  Top-down 
reform has been largely technical, designed to improve the quality of 
courts without altering institutional relationships with other state actors.  
The growth of horizontal relationships suggests that courts may be able to 
expand their own autonomy by looking to other courts for guidance rather 
than to Party-state officials or court superiors.   
Second, judicial networks may foster innovation.  A small number 
of local courts have engaged in significant legal innovation.  Courts in 
China have long engaged in experimentation.  In recent years, however, 
some courts have issued decisions that appear directly to challenge 
existing legal norms or consciously to break new legal ground.  Thus, for 
example, local courts have experimented with creating a plea bargaining 
system for criminal cases and with the creation of a system of local 
precedent – despite the fact that neither is explicitly permitted under 
existing law.  In another example of innovation, a court in Henan ruled, in 
what became known as the “Seed Case,” that a provincial pricing 
regulation was “spontaneously invalid” because it conflicted with the 
national Seed Law.  The court thus challenged norms that dictate that 
courts lack the power to invalidate laws or regulations.  The case 
generated a backlash from the provincial People’s Congress, which 
sought to have the judges responsible for the case removed from office.  
The judges initially lost their jobs, but regained their positions after the 
national media reported on the case.88 
                                                   
87 Similar observations have been made regarding the growth of trans-national judicial 
networks.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (Princeton University 
Press 2004). 
88 For a discussion of the case, see Zhao Lei, Li Huijuan: tiaozhan difang lifa [Li Huijuan: 
challenging local legislation], July 25, 2004, 
http://www.dffy.com/fayanguancha/fangyuan/200407/20040725162155.htm.  Some scholars 
in China have argued that the Seed Case should not be understood as novel or innovative, 
because it is well-established that judges should not apply local or provincial regulations that 
conflict with higher-level laws or regulations.   But the Seed Case did appear innovative in 
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Likewise, courts in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou have 
innovated by finding for the media in defamation cases brought by 
famous persons.  The courts have directly or indirectly suggested that 
famous persons should withstand a higher degree of scrutiny than 
ordinary persons – despite the absence of any distinction between 
ordinary and “public persons” in Chinese defamation law.89  And in a 
series of cases brought by university students, courts have held that 
universities may be sued under China’s Administrative Litigation Law – 
despite the widespread presumption that the law did not apply to 
universities. 90   The cases have been interpreted as efforts by Chinese 
courts to expand their jurisdiction in administrative litigation, a 
noteworthy trend given that commentators have argued that courts have 
been reluctant to undertake administrative cases given the often 
influential positions of defendants in such cases.91   
 Some judicial innovation is the consequence of the wide 
discretion Chinese judges have in resolving cases.  Unclear legal 
standards mean that courts frequently must fill gaps.  Despite an 
enormous volume of legislation over the past two decades, judges 
continue to have extensive discretion in interpreting legal standards.  
Increased use of this discretion may largely reflect practical necessity, not 
increased court authority.   Such discretion may also result in inconsistent 
application of the law, a problem that has drawn attention, and significant 
criticism, in recent years.  Nevertheless, in some recent cases courts have 
gone further than simply filling the gaps of unclear laws, directly 
challenging norms, as in the Seed Case, or creating legal standards that 
lack statutory support.   
   Court experimentation and innovation occurs in politically safe 
cases, and outcomes are usually consistent with the interests of important 
Party-state actors.  Such decisions rarely challenge the authority of other 
state actors.  Indeed, it may be that innovation is only possible in cases in 
which outcomes are consistent with powerful interests or there are no 
strong adverse interests.  Thus, for example, the first case to find a public 
person standard resulted in a judgment in favour of a newspaper that was 
a subsidiary of the official mouthpiece newspaper of the Shanghai 
                                                                                                                        
that the court chose to declare the local regulation invalid, rather than simply ignoring the 
local regulation and applying the national law. 
89 Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation:  An Empirical Account of 
Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 33, 33-177 (2006). 
90 For analysis of the cases, see Thomas F. Kellogg, “Courageous Explorers”?: Education 
Litigation and Judicial Innovation in China, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007). 
91 For an example of such arguments, see Li Fujin, Xingzheng shenpan de kunjing yu chulu 
[The difficulties in and remedies for administrative adjudication], Sept. 19, 2003, 
http://www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/xz/200311/20031119203349.htm. 
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Municipal Communist Party Committee.  Even in the Seed Case, where 
the court directly challenged the authority of the Provincial People’s 
Congress, the court found in favour of applying a national law. 
 The modest reach of judicial innovation in China highlights a key 
element of court reform.  With a very small number of exceptions, top-
down reform has focussed on improving the efficiency and fairness of 
courts as adjudicators of disputes, not on shifting the role or power of 
courts within the system.  The SPC does from time to time issue judicial 
interpretations that appear to go well beyond the text of laws the National 
People’s Congress has passed, but such interpretations rarely result in 
direct challenges to the authority of other institutions.  When courts do 
appear to be seeking to expand their authority, including in defamation 
litigation, the Seed Case, and some aspects of administrative litigation, 
such steps have come from lower courts.92  Higher courts may directly or 
indirectly support or acquiesce to such actions, and the SPC itself has 
been responsible for a number of important reforms. 93   Nevertheless, 
significant institutional change is not the direct result of top-down reform.  
China’s courts have not begun to function as significant fora for 
the adjudication of public rights.  Indeed, the limited rise in caseloads and 
the other modest steps toward reform suggest that China’s courts are still 
some way from being effective adjudicators of private rights or even a 
primary mechanism for resolving individual grievances.  In many 
respects, recent developments in China thus contrast with experiences in 
many other countries, which have witnessed a “global expansion of 
judicial power.”94  This is not surprising; with limited exceptions, this 
expansion of judicial power has largely occurred in democratic states in 
which courts have the power of judicial review.95  Moreover, Chinese 
courts are still struggling to become significant fora for adjudicating and 
enforcing private rights; doing so may be a predicate to serving a broader 
role in adjudicating public rights.  Recent developments in China’s courts 
also appear to contrast with other countries in which significant 
                                                   
92 One exception to this pattern was the Qi Yuling case, in which the Supreme People’s Court 
in 2001 seemed to suggest that a case could be brought directly under the PRC Constitution.  
The decision was both opaque and controversial, and no subsequent cases have endorsed or 
acknowledged the principle. 
93 One recent example is the SPC’s decision to reform death penalty procedures and to hear all 
final appeals itself.  A consequence of the reform will be a major expansion of the size of the 
SPC, with as many as 300 new judges being added to the court. 
94 C. NEAL TATE  & TORBJORN VALLINDER, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power:  The 
Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1-11 (New York 
University Press 1995). 
95 Id.; TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 6 (Cambridge University Press 
2003). 
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innovation or expansion of judicial power has often come from the top, in 
particular from new or revamped constitutional courts.  In China, the 
most significant innovations appear to be coming from lower courts.  
Reliance on local experimentation has been a characteristic of 
China’s reform process more generally, and thus the courts are not unique 
in relying on ground-up development.  The nature of such reforms also 
may reflect the fact that there is not a clear consensus on the role courts 
should play in China; gradual and piecemeal reform may serve to delay 
such questions.  But recent trends also suggest that courts may come to 
play broader roles and that such roles may be determined by lower courts 
and litigants as well as by SPC edicts.   
Third, although China’s courts are not fora for adjudicating public 
rights, they have become fora for airing a range of grievances.96   Over the 
past decade, litigants have brought a widening array of what might be 
thought of as public grievances into the courts – including class actions, 
public interest lawsuits on such issues as women’s and environmental 
rights, and constitutional claims.97  Many such cases are being brought 
with the assistance of lawyers who are explicitly seeking to use litigation 
to bring social change.  Courts have not always been receptive to such 
claims; many such cases go unheard, unresolved, or, where decisions are 
actually made, unenforced.  The Party-state also appears increasingly 
wary of such efforts, and has imposed new restrictions on lawyers and on 
public interest litigation. 98   But the fact that these claims have been 
permitted and at times even encouraged is particularly notable given 
China’s political system: the combination of class actions, contingency 
fees, administrative litigation, constitutional litigation, and cause 
lawyering is not common in authoritarian systems (or in many systems of 
any type outside the United States).   
Such claims also highlight a characteristic of public litigation and 
cause lawyering in China: when such claims succeed it is rarely because 
of court decisions.  The primary goal of many such lawsuits is to generate 
                                                   
96 Liebman, Innovation through Intimidation.  For example, the total number of labour cases 
heard by the courts more than doubled between 2000 and 2004, increasing from 76,378 to 164, 
994. LAW Y.B. CHINA 2001-2005.  
97 Benjamin L. Liebman, Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523 
(1998). 
98 For example, in March 2006 the All-China Lawyers Association issued a notice requiring 
lawyers handling collective (defined as involving ten or more people) or sensitive disputes to 
report such representation to, and accept “guidance from,” the local lawyers’ association and 
justice bureau, Zhonghua quanguo lüshi xiehui guanyu lüshi banli quntixing anjian zhidao 
yijian [Guidance notice of the All-China Lawyers Association regarding lawyers’ handling of 
group cases], Mar. 20, 2006,  
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/200606/20060620110110.htm. 
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public, and in particular media, attention sufficient to compel official 
action.  When change does result, it is more often from the intervention of 
Party-state officials than from a court opinion.  Litigants may hope for a 
binding court decision, but using the courts as a forum for generating 
public pressure is often equally, if not more, important in cases in which 
claims succeed.  The use of litigation to create public pressure and to 
compel extra-judicial action is not unique to China, but China may be 
distinct in its extreme reliance on extra-judicial responses to major public 
disputes in the courts. 
Recent steps by China’s courts to hear a broader range of 
grievances are largely reactive: the use of courts to pursue public 
grievances reflects rising expectations among ordinary people toward the 
courts.  These expectations and efforts are at least partially a consequence 
of attention to the law and the legal system in the Chinese media.  Such 
trends also reflect the development of the Chinese legal profession.  The 
fact that China now has more than 150,000 lawyers 99  is resulting in 
greater incentives to lawyers to bring a wider range of cases.     
Measuring popular confidence, or disillusionment, in the courts is 
difficult.  Courts have been subject to widespread criticism in the media, 
for reasons ranging from corruption and biased decisions to inconsistent 
application of legal standards. 100  Greater use of the courts may suggest 
greater confidence in the courts among ordinary people, but it may also 
reflect the rising volume of grievances and the lack of alternative 
mechanisms for resolving complaints.  Thus individuals may resort to the 
courts not because they believe the courts will be more effective than 
administrative actors but rather because they believe that they lack the 
ability to obtain redress through administrative means.  Regardless of 
why individuals turn to the courts, growing media coverage and greater 
use of the courts risk increased disillusionment, and thus decreased 
reliance on the courts, if such expectations are not met. 
                                                   
99 LAW Y.B. CHINA 2006, at 1001.  
100 Liebman, Innovation through Intimidation.  For example, Teng Biao advocates media 
oversight of the courts on the grounds that the judiciary is not independent, fair, or efficient, 
and that the courts are widely distrusted.  Teng Biao, Sifa de gui sifa, yulun de gui yulun? - 
cong Zhang Jinzhu an dao Huang Jing an [Give the judiciary what belongs to the judiciary, 
give public opinion what belongs to public opinion? - From the Zhang Jinzhu case to the 
Huang Jing case], http://www.boxun.com/hero/tengb/20_1.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). 
For an argument that continued people’s congress supervision of the courts is necessary to 
correct court violations of the law, see Zhang Hanchang & Gao Lixia, Guanyu fayuan xiang 
renda jiqi changweihui baogao gongzuo zhidu de falü sikao [Thoughts about the legal system 
of courts’ reporting to people’s congresses and their standing committees], July 19, 2002, 
RENDA JIANSHE [PEOPLE'S CONGRESS CONSTRUCTION], available at 
http://kbs.cnki.net/Forums/PrintThread.aspx?PostID=27231. 
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The developments discussed here do not reflect the full reach of 
court reform in China.  Important reforms have also been undertaken in 
developing rules of evidence, in clarifying oversight systems within 
courts, and in providing judges with better access to legal information.  In 
addition, recently announced reforms to procedures in capital cases may 
have a significant effect on the criminal process.  But few, if any, such 
changes touch on the courts’ power relative to other state actors.  
Nevertheless, the diverging expectations toward courts among senior 
officials, local judges, and ordinary litigants also reflect a system in 
which the proper and potential roles of the courts are increasingly 
contested and in which courts are increasingly coming into conflict with 
other state actors. 
 
V. IMPLICATIONS:  RESTRICTED REFORM? 
 
The fact that much of the important change is coming from the 
bottom shows that assessing reform in China’s courts may be difficult.  It 
also reflects the need to distinguish between changes in courts’ roles and 
steps that make the courts more efficient and fair in their existing roles.  
This section first examines in more detail whether recent developments 
suggest changes in court’s formal authority, and then returns to the two 
questions posed at the start of this essay. 
 
A. Reformed Authority? 
 
Recent developments do not suggest fundamental changes in 
courts’ power relative to other state actors.  This is not surprising:  most 
court reform has come from the courts themselves, but strengthening 
court power is not something that the courts can do on their own.  As Part 
I argues, courts have engaged in significant reforms in recent years and 
are better positioned than in the past to resist some forms of external 
pressure.  But reforms have largely addressed technical or administrative 
problems: improving education and training of judges, raising 
qualifications of new judges, fighting corruption, and taking modest steps 
to reduce the political emphasis in court work.  Central Party leaders have 
not emphasized reform or strengthening of the courts; indeed courts 
received only modest attention in the reports of the 15th and 16th 
Congresses of the Communist Party, in 1997 and 2002.    
Nevertheless, significant change is coming from the courts.  
Courts have taken steps to increase their own autonomy and authority, by 
raising education standards and by increasingly using legal arguments to 
resist external pressure.  A small number of lower courts have begun to 
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engage in significant innovation.  Such developments suggest that, 
despite the formal limitations on court authority, the future role of courts 
may be significantly influenced by how courts define their own roles and 
by how litigants use the courts.  There is significant room for ground-up 
evolution.    
Such evolution reflects necessity:  courts are confronting a 
widening range of cases and cases of increased complexity.  Courts are 
under pressure to resolve disputes that come before them in ways that 
prevent claims from escalating but often lack clear legal guidance as to 
how to do so.  They thus have both the incentive and the space to engage 
in innovation and experimentation.  As Part III explains, most such cases 
result in outcomes that are consistent with powerful interests; there are 
few signs of courts doing so in ways that diverge from the interests of 
powerful parties.  
Ground-up developments in the courts may, however, also be 
resulting in courts that are increasingly in conflict with other Party-state 
and official institutions.  This is particularly apparent in court interactions 
with the media, where courts have responded to media oversight by 
imposing limits on reporting and filing defamation lawsuits.  But courts 
also appear to be increasingly in conflict with people’s congresses and 
procuratorates, both of which have attempted to strengthen their 
supervision of the courts, and also with administrative departments.  Thus 
although courts have not expanded their authority over other state actors, 
it does appear that court decisions are likely to result in greater friction 
with such actors. 
 
B.  Explaining New Roles  
 
Recognizing the limitations of court reform in China is not meant 
to trivialize the changes thus far.  Given that there was virtually no 
functional legal system when legal reforms commenced in 1978, and the 
political context in which China’s courts operate, it would have been 
unrealistic to expect a faster rate of change.  Indeed, asking why China’s 
courts are not more independent or more powerful may be less important 
than understanding why courts have been permitted to develop as they 
have.  Why have courts been permitted to hear a wider range of 
grievances and to take even modest steps in the direction of increased 
authority and autonomy?  Put differently, why has China’s leadership 
tolerated developments such as administrative litigation, class actions, 
contingency fees, and a widening sphere of public interest litigation?  
Courts have been permitted to innovate, in some cases by directly looking 
to Western precedent.  The state itself has devoted significant resources to 
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developing a legal aid system and to legal education, encouraging not 
only greater awareness of law but also more frequent use of law to 
challenge official actors. 
Western writings on the roles of courts have largely focused on 
the question of why a democratic regime would create independent 
courts. 101     Theories include the desire to make political bargains 
credible,102 the usefulness of courts to politicians who wish to shift blame 
from unpopular government policies, 103  and courts’ roles in keeping 
administrative bureaucracies in line with government policy.104  Others 
have argued that independent courts are a product of political competition 
and are attractive to political parties that may one day find themselves out 
of power, 105  or that judicial review is attractive to new democracies 
because it serves as “insurance to potential electoral losers.”106   Such 
theories have limited applicability in China, where a non-democratic 
regime has encouraged development of the courts, and where courts have 
limited powers over other administrative actors. 
 Another common explanation for the creation of a functional legal 
system is that such institutions are necessary for economic development.  
An interest in economic development has certainly played a role in 
China’s legal reforms, and reforming legal institutions may be a more 
important justification for court reform going forward.  But this 
explanation appears unsatisfactory in China, where economic 
development has progressed despite the absence of a legal system that 
provides effective guarantees of property rights.  A desire to conform to 
international norms may play some role – but also seems a weak 
explanation for China’s recent experiences, in particular the 
encouragement of class actions and cause lawyering.  Three alternative 
theories are more plausible.   
 First, courts are one of a number of Party-state institutions serving 
as a safety valve for a widening range of popular complaints.  Permitting 
grievances to be raised through class actions, administrative litigation, or 
                                                   
101 The list provided here is not exhaustive.  For more detailed analysis, see Stephenson, When 
the Devil Turns…, supra, note 2. 
102 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group 
Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 875-901 (1975). 
103 Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why 
Do We Have an Independent Judiciary, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 349-79 (1993).  
104 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:  Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 American Journal of Political Science 165, 165-179 (1984). 
105 J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In) Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23  
J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 721-47 (1993); J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 122-168 (University of Chicago Press 2003); Stephenson, When the 
Devil Turns, at 83-86, supra, note 2. 
106 GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 96, at 24. 
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even (in a small number of cases) constitutional litigation may be 
preferable to such complaints not being heard at all – or being raised on 
the streets.   The safety valve function of courts also explains why courts 
may accept but then not decide some difficult cases:  the hope may be that 
once cases are filed, grievances will dissipate over time. The courts are 
not unique, or even particularly prominent, in this role.  The letters and 
visits system plays a broader, and arguably more significant, function as a 
safety valve.  Courts are thus one of a number of fora for raising 
grievances and courts that permit such grievances to be raised act in the 
interests of social stability. 
Concern with social stability also helps explain inconsistent trends 
in court reform.  The Party-state has emphasized the role of the courts and 
has given tremendous attention to courts and law in the media.  At the 
same time, Party-state leaders continue to tolerate, and even encourage, a 
range of official and quasi-official actors to intervene in court decision-
making.  Concerns with social stability force Party-state officials to strive 
to be even more responsive to public views than might be the case in a 
democratic system.  The fact that all actors in the system know that Party-
officials have the power to intervene and are evaluated in significant part 
based on whether or not they maintain stability in their regions makes it 
difficult for officials to ignore protests on the grounds that the authority of 
the courts must be respected.   
Authoritarian regimes may have a greater stake in being 
responsive to public demands regarding the courts than democratic states, 
where the political process provides a mechanism for public grievances to 
be aired and resolved.  The legitimacy of China’s leadership depends on 
its ability to both channel and contain populism; concerns that popular 
expressions of outrage may spin out of control encourage rapid 
intervention in the legal system.  The counter-majoritarian function of 
courts thus may be harder to accept in a non-democratic society, where 
courts lack authority and public confidence, than in a democracy.  This is 
particularly the case in China, where the rise of social unrest makes 
officials particularly sensitive to public opinion and where the courts lack 
a history of being viewed as either authoritative or neutral. 
Such developments pose risks to the courts.  The courts and the 
Party-state are fostering increased expectations that the courts can and 
should be used as a vehicle for protecting legal rights.  The risk is that, 
absent greater change in and to the courts, such expectations will not be 
met and trust and confidence in the courts will be further eroded – 
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sending those with grievances to other institutions in even greater 
numbers.107 
Second, the evolving roles of courts, including increasing 
conflicts with other Party-state institutions, reflect the development of 
institutional competition in the Chinese political system.  The central 
Party-state has encouraged a range of official actors – including courts, 
the media, letters and visits bureaux, the procuratorates, Party discipline 
authorities, and peoples’ congresses – to play oversight roles, often over 
each other.  Attempts by the courts to expand their autonomy and 
authority are consistent with similar steps being taken by other actors.  
This reflects an emerging characteristic of institutional relationships in 
China, one that appears to be a crucial part of the institutionalization of 
the Party-state that has helped to explain its resilience. 108   The aim 
appears to be to encourage a range of official actors to expand their roles 
in resolving grievances and fighting abuses, and to serve as checks on 
each other.  Some greater transparency is encouraged, but within the 
limits of Party oversight and primarily by Party-state actors.  Courts are 
one of many institutions playing such complimentary roles.  Others 
include procuratorates, the media, people’s congresses, and Party 
discipline commissions.  Thus any expansion in court roles or authority 
may reflect the increased attention to resolving grievances and expanding 
oversight in the Chinese system, not greater authority of the courts.  
Wrongdoing is addressed, and Party-state legitimacy is maintained, 
without fostering the development of non-state checks on official action.   
Chinese courts thus serve not as an arbiter among different interests in the 
political system, but rather as one of many institutions playing parallel 
roles.  China’s leadership is sensitive to the possibility that allowing more 
prominent roles to non-state actors may undermine central authority.   In 
the legal system, however, allowing a widening range of grievances to be 
brought by individuals and organizations may also be an effective tool for 
asserting state control.   
Similarly, the permissive attitude toward some developments in 
the courts reflects the fact that courts are not viewed as rival sources of 
power.  Party officials are not worried that courts may become significant 
checks on official action.  Instead, development of the courts serves state 
                                                   
107 Cf., Liang Jianbin, Renmin weishenme dui fazhi xianzhuang bu manyi? [Why are people 
dissatisfied with the current situation in the legal system?], Feb. 8, 2006, 
http://www.acla.org.cn/forum/showflat.php?Cat=&Number=667728&Main=666892. Liang 
argues that the greater promises the courts make, the greater disillusionment that will result 
when courts fail to meet such standards. 
108 Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 6, 6-17 No. 1 
(Jan. 2003). 
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interests in curbing abuses, maintaining control, and using the 
development of the legal system to reinforce state legitimacy. 
Third, ground-up development of the courts may be a source of 
judicial power.  The ability of judges to network horizontally may lead to 
greater authority and autonomy of the courts.  The trajectory of court 
development may not be entirely determined by top down edicts, or 
constitutional structure.  Chinese judges themselves are increasingly 
looking to the roles judges play in other countries as they seek to define 
their own positions.  Likewise, litigants’ aspirations for the legal system 
appear to derive from both rising attention to the role of law and courts 
and from international norms.  This explanation for recent developments 
in China’s courts is one perhaps not fully explored in recent writings 
about judicial power.   
Many countries have experienced an expansion of judicial power 
in recent decades, often from constitutional courts, from the top-down.  It 
remains too soon to speak of fundamental changes to the power of 
China’s courts.  But China may be unusual in the importance of ground-
up developments. 
 
C. Future Roles:  Fairness without Independence? 
 
  Understanding why the Chinese Party-state has permitted even 
the level of court reform experienced thus far yields insight into a central 
question facing China’s courts:  what are the possible limits of court 
development in a non-democratic society?  Many in the West and in 
China have looked to China’s courts in the hope that they may play a 
transformative role in the Chinese political system.  But the more 
pertinent question, at least at present, may be what role courts can play 
within the current system.  Can courts play a significant non-
transformative role – can they serve as fair and efficient adjudicators of 
private disputes, and perhaps as checks on some forms of official action, 
without political change?  And, if they do so, will they legitimize Party 
rule, or will the development of a more professionalized judiciary 
inevitably lead to courts that challenge Party authority?   
Recent developments and debates in China have largely avoided 
this question.109  Many in China seeking greater authority for the courts 
have been heavily influenced by Western, and in particular American, 
writings on courts.  Some of the discussion in China echoes debates 
                                                   
109 One exception is the work of “new-left” scholars such as Pan Wei, who have argued that 
China can and should establish rule of law without democracy. See, e.g., Pan Wei, Fazhi yu 
weilai de zhongguo zhengti [Rule of Law and China’s Future Political System], 1999 
ZHANLÜE YU GUANLI [STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT], No. 5, at 30-6 (1999). 
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concerning the role of the judiciary in democracies:  what is the 
relationship between courts and legislatures, do courts have too much 
discretion to interpret vague laws, are courts subject to excessive popular, 
and in particular media, pressure?  But the questions facing China’s 
courts and judges may also be very different from those faced by their 
counterparts in the West.  Can judges develop the capacity to resolve non-
sensitive cases fairly?  Can the range of cases subject to external 
intervention be reduced?  Can courts be encouraged to do so without at 
the same time prompting courts to play broader roles?  Does the fact that 
the Chinese courts operate in a non-democratic context suggest that they 
should have a greater, or lesser, role in resolving important questions 
facing Chinese society?  
China’s effort to create courts that act fairly without challenging 
single-Party rule is not unprecedented.  Other single-party states – 
including Spain under Franco, and modern Singapore – have had courts 
that commentators have viewed as largely fair and independent in their 
handling of non-sensitive or non-political cases.110  Parallels may also be 
drawn to Japanese courts, which were largely independent both in the late 
imperial period and also, after democratization, during the long period of 
Liberal Democratic Party rule.111  Similarly, recent writing on Egypt has 
explored why that authoritarian regime has created an independent 
constitutional court.112 
Recent Chinese experience does not fit squarely into any of these 
models.  In contrast to Singapore and Japan, for example, the range of 
cases deemed to be sensitive in China is extraordinarily wide – and 
includes not only direct challenges to Party authority or major criminal 
cases, but also a wide range of cases attracting public attention, as well as 
cases involving litigants with ties to Party-state officials.  In contrast to 
Franco’s Spain, where a degree of independence was possible because 
courts’ powers were extremely limited and courts played little role in 
                                                   
110 Jose J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of 
Contemporary Spain,  9 LAW & SOC’Y REV 475, 475-96 No. 3 (1975). 
111 John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the Public 
Trust, at 16-19 (Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, Faculty Working Papers 
Series, Paper No. 05-10-01) (forthcoming in DANIEL J. FOOTE, ed., LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING 
POINT (University of Washington Press forthcoming 2007)). Haley notes a long tradition of 
judicial independence in Japan stretching back to the 19th century. In contrast to Haley, Mark 
Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen argue that courts in democratic Japan, although generally 
independent, have yielded to LDP interests in certain sensitive cases. J. MARK RAMSEYER & 
ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
JUDGING IN JAPAN 122-3 (University of Chicago Press 2003).  Haley, in contrast, finds no 
evidence of such political influence on modern Japanese courts. 
112 Tamir Moustafa, Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 2003 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 883, 883-930. 
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creating legal values, China’s courts have become significant fora for the 
airing of rights-based grievances.  And in contrast to Egypt, where the 
constitutional court was established and developed in significant part due 
to its role in furthering economic development, courts in China have 
developed into significant fora for the airing of rights-based claims even 
absent their serving as effective guarantors of property rights. 113  
Moreover, the most significant changes in Chinese courts’ roles appear to 
be coming from lower courts, not the Supreme People’s Court. 
Those looking for China’s courts to be agents of change are likely 
to be disappointed.  The fact that a widening range of cases – including 
labour rights, constitutional claims, and environmental disputes – is 
finding its way into court does not necessarily mean that courts are 
playing a greater role in enforcing rights protections.  Courts’ roles 
remain largely reactive, and their reactive capacities remain weak.  Courts 
are still struggling to develop the functional ability to resolve individual 
cases.  In the short term, the crucial question for the courts is whether 
they can further develop the capacity to serve as neutral and efficient 
decision-makers in routine, private cases.   
Developing the capacity of China’s courts to handle routine cases 
fairly would be a significant accomplishment.  Doing so would also be 
consistent with two of the three explanations offered above for the 
development of the courts to date:  serving as a safety-valve for 
discontent and grievances, and institutionalizing the operation of the 
Party-state.  But the third explanation for court development, that 
horizontal and ground-up development of the courts may lead to greater 
court autonomy, suggests that further development of the courts may also 
give rise to increased tensions with other Party-state actors.  As courts 
continue to develop horizontally, and as judges develop professional 
identities, it may become increasingly difficult to constrain court 
development.  By encouraging the development of more professional 
judges, the Party-state may also be fostering greater challenges.  
Debate over the proper role of courts is a characteristic of most 
societies, and in particular of democratic societies.  What is particularly 
noteworthy about recent developments in China is that such debates have 
become open, with scholars, judges, and other commentators arguing for 
expanded judicial power, for fundamental changes to the structure of 
courts, and even for court oversight of the Communist Party.  Debates in 
China about the role of courts thus resonate with debates in the West – 
                                                   
113 In Egypt, as Moustafa describes, the Constitutional Court has developed into a forum for 
challenging the regime. In China, in contrast, courts have neither challenged single-Party rule 
nor served as fora for those seeking to do so.  
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where there is of course also significant ambiguity and controversy about 
the proper roles of courts acting in counter-majoritarian fashion in 
democratic societies.  China’s courts continue to face many problems that 
have undermined their effectiveness for decades; but they also appear 
increasingly to be confronting the types of questions and challenges that 
are faced by courts in other societies, albeit in a very different political 
context.  
Recent developments suggest that courts’ ability to serve broader 
aims may depend on their developing greater authority, either on their 
own or at the behest of the Party-state.  Courts’ ability to do so will be 
shaped by Party-state policy, but will also reflect the continued ground-up 
development of the courts.  The roles of courts and judges are no longer 
solely defined by top-down pronouncements; courts, judges, litigants, and 
the media are all shaping expectations about the roles that the legal 
system can and should play.  Judges appear to be looking to the roles 
judges play in other countries as they seek to define their own positions; 
litigants’ aspirations likewise appear to derive both from rising attention 
to the role of judges and from international norms.  Recent attempts to 
steer judges away from “Western rule of law theories” are a tacit 
acknowledgment of such trends.  Continued ground-up development of 
the courts may be crucial to courts’ serving the Party’s interests – but may 
also promote new challenges.  The central question remains whether 
courts can become fair arbiters of individual disputes without inevitably 
questioning and challenging the political power of the state.  The most 
significant development regarding China’s courts is that their role is 
increasingly contested.  
 
 
